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ABSTRACT 
TWO ESSAYS ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FINANCIAL 
DEVELOPMENT AND INCOME DISTRIBUTION 
 
by 
Ruixin Zhang 
 
The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, May 2014 
Under the Supervision of Professor Mohsen Bahmani-Oskooee 
 
This dissertation consists of two chapters on the relation between financial development, 
income inequality and poverty. The first chapter examines the relationship between 
financial deepening and income inequality for 16 countries based on a time series 
approach. Unlike previous work that focuses on testing the credit channel (private credit 
and bank asset) through which finance improves inequality, this chapter also investigates 
the deposit channel (liquid liabilities and bank deposit). The results suggest that the 
finance-inequality relationships behave differently across countries. Five countries 
support the reducing-inequality function through the credit channel, whereas three 
countries are found to support the deposit channel. In India, Japan, Bolivia, Malta and the 
United States, financial deepening is actually harming the income distribution. By 
implementing instrumental variable regressions on a sample of 144 countries from 1961 
to 2011, the second chapter extends the examination from financial deepening to multiple 
dimensions of financial development—financial access, efficiency, stability and openness. 
Evidence shows that, except for financial openness, the development of the financial 
system can significantly improve the income inequality and poverty in an economy. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
As using financial services becomes inevitable to each individual, economists 
have more than enough reasons to explore the impacts of finance on many aspects of the 
economy. This includes how financial development affects the distribution of national 
income. If financial development disproportionately enhances the income of the poor 
more than it does for the rich, income inequality can be narrowed; otherwise, inequality 
worsens. Such impacts could be complex, however, depending on the aspects of financial 
systems and the indicators of income distribution used in the research. Bearing this in 
mind, this work provides a comprehensive study on the finance-inequality nexus.   
 
This dissertation consists of two chapters on the relation between financial 
development, income inequality and poverty. The development of the financial system 
has been mostly agreed as a driver of economic growth. However, even with the 
phenomenal economic achievement, developing countries as well as developed countries 
are still concerned about the income disparity and poverty. It triggers the question that 
how finance shapes the distribution of the resultant growth in total income. This 
dissertation is aimed at revealing the impact of finance on inequality and poverty beyond 
its positive effect on economic growth. The first chapter features in revealing the effect 
through financial deepening and applying a time series approach. The second chapter, 
using instrumental variable estimations, is more interested in impacts from various 
dimensions of financial development—financial depth, access, efficiency, stability and 
openness. 
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In chapter one, based on an error correction model approach, I examine the 
relationship between financial deepening and income inequality in 16 countries 
separately. Unlike previous work that focuses on cross country approach to test only the 
credit channel (private credit and bank asset) through which finance can reduce inequality, 
this paper also investigates the deposit channel (liquid liabilities and bank deposit). The 
results suggest that finance depth and income inequality relationships behave differently 
across countries. Five countries support the reducing-inequality function through the 
credit channel, whereas three countries are found to support the deposit channel. In India, 
Japan, Bolivia, Malta and the United States, financial deepening is actually harming the 
income distribution. 
 
Chapter two builds on an aggregate estimation approach. The interest in the 
finance-inequality nexus not only includes the financial deepening, but also involves four 
other characteristics. We provide evidence on the linkage of financial development and 
income distribution, based on a multi-dimensional investigation. Unlike the existing 
literature, which has mainly focused on the depth of financial development, this study 
considers financial access, efficiency, stability and openness in its empirical regressions. 
Furthermore, each dimension is represented by two indicators: one covering financial 
institutions, and the other, financial markets (except for financial openness). By 
implementing instrumental variable regressions on a sample of 144 countries from 1961 
to 2011, this chapter finds that financial development can significantly reduce income 
inequality and poverty, through the improvement of all the dimensions except for the 
financial liberalization. Furthermore, replacing the dependent variable with five income 
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quintiles separately, additional evidence is provided to verify the effects on gini-
coefficient.
4 
 
 
CHAPTER 1:  ON THE RELATION BETWEEN FINANCIAL DEEPENING AND 
INCOME INEQUALITY 
 
1.1. Introduction 
Over the last century, the world financial system has had a phenomenal 
development in both the depth and breadth. A vast amount of literature has concluded 
that such development in the financial sector can positively affect the economic growth. 
However, it is still unclear that how the financial development further directs the 
distribution of the income.  
 
Many people are concerned that the upper income group and the privilege class 
can significantly benefit from financial development. These groups of individuals either 
possess valuable collateral or have privilege to access finance, which offers them quality 
education, opportunities to invest and become entrepreneurs.  Thus a relatively larger 
share of the growing total income falls into the upper income segment, and widens the 
gap between rich and poor. However, if the development of the financial system features 
in substantially improving access to credit and deepening credit for the relatively low 
income group, then the poor can disproportionately benefit. The economy tends to have a 
more equalized distribution of income. Thus instead of studying the impact of financial 
development on economic growth, this paper is interested in revealing its impact on the 
distribution of income. 
 
Almost all of the previous works draw conclusions based on cross-country and 
panel regressions, tending to suffer from aggregation bias and sample selection bias. I use 
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an error correction model (ECM) to examine the finance-inequality nexus in 16 countries 
separately and provide country-specific effects.  Furthermore, unlike previous work 
focusing only on the credit channel (private credit and bank asset), this paper also tests 
the deposit channel (liquid liabilities and bank deposit). Nonetheless, the ratio of bank 
credit to bank deposit is also used to capture how the allocation of deposit affects income 
distribution. 
 
Our results suggest that the finance-inequality relationships behave differently 
across countries and financial variables. Basically, results in 5 countries support the 
reducing-inequality function through the credit channel, whereas 3 countries are found to 
support the deposit channel. In India, Japan, Bolivia, Malta and the United States, 
financial deepening is actually harming the income distribution. 
 
The rest of the chapter is arranged as follows: Section 1.2 provides literature 
reviews on the finance-inequality nexus; Section 1.3 introduces data and model; Section 
1.4 presents estimation results and Section 1.5 draws conclusion and policy 
recommendations.  
 
1.2. Financial Deepening and Income Inequality 
The early study of Kuznets (1955) speculates the well-known hypothesis on 
income inequality, which states that income inequality has the tendency to increase in the 
early development stage but will improve as development matures. Kuznets postulates 
this hypothesis from the cumulative effects of both savings and urbanization. Compare to 
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the upper-income bracket that can easily accumulate savings and generate significant 
amount of returns, the lower-income group does not have much income left for saving. 
Thus the gap between the rich and the poor can enlarge. On the other hand, the income 
inequality within the urban area is much higher than within the rural places.  As the 
urbanization process speeds up, the nationwide income inequality certainly widens. 
However, the political, demographic, and social factors will fight and contract the 
cumulative effects of savings and urbanizations (i.e. the progressive tax and the 
advocating for equal individual opportunities) as the industrialization and urbanization 
process reach to a stable stage.  
 
Kuznets’ pioneer postulation has been given the name of inversed U-hypothesis in 
the later related research. Some studies, e.g., Bahmani and Gelan (2012), Deninger and 
Squire (1998) as well as Banerjee and Duflo (2003), have already verified the existence 
of such correlations. 
 
During the past few decades many economists have attempted to reveal the 
inequality-growth relationship, or the finance-growth links. The literature on these two 
topics separately is both tending to mature. But, not a lot have focused on the role of 
finance in shaping the income distribution, especially the theoretical work. The few 
existing research related to this subject makes ambiguous predictions. Various channels 
through which the finance system can affect income distribution are considered in these 
theoretical works, including saving accumulation, human capital accumulation and 
investment opportunities. 
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Through the most conventional way, according to Jeanneney and Kpodar (2011), 
banks can provide at least a positive return on deposits which can benefit the poor 
families. And the poor can thus smooth consumption for future shocks. McKinnon (1973) 
proposes a “conduit effect” of finance, which says that financial expansion increases the 
amount of domestic savings, and decreases the price for borrowing. As a result, the 
investment opportunities for the poor household will increase. However, as pointed out 
by Kuznets (1955), the accumulation of saving might benefit the rich more than the poor. 
 
Another channel through which finance affects the income inequality is the 
human capital accumulation. Galor and Zeira(1993) discover an inextricable link between 
financial market and income distribution with a model attempting to explore the causal 
effect of wealth distribution and the persistent difference in macro economies. 
Specifically, this equilibrium model allows for bequests between generations, therefore 
agents can produce as skilled labor in the second stage if they invested in human capital 
in the first period. However, as there are imperfection in credit market and indivisibility 
in investment, only agents with enough inheritance can afford investment in human 
capital and work as skilled labor. Thus financial market imperfection harms economic 
growth and income distribution. Furthermore, the model states that long-run economic 
growth depends on the initial portion of adequately inherited agents. As the credit 
constraint diminishes, inequality becomes less likely to affect the economic growth. 
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Finance can also affect the income distribution through providing investment 
opportunities. With a transaction cost, finance may restrain the poor from having quality 
investment projects. Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) incorporate this finance issue into 
an inequality and growth model. Their key assumption is a fixed cost to participate 
financial intermediary, which provides the member with higher quality projects, higher 
returns and can also spread the risks. Due to the constraint of the fixed cost and low 
income, poor people will not be able to join the intermediary and income inequality 
widens. But even with the mild speed of income accumulation, more people can afford 
the fixed joining fee. Eventually, a large size of financial intermediary fosters faster 
economic growth and more equal income distribution. This model verifies a similar 
inverted-U relationship as seen in Kuznets (1955), but emphasizes this relation depends 
on the size of financial intermediary. 
 
The model build by Banerjee and Newman (1993) assumes that finance can 
provide entrepreneurship opportunities. The imperfection of the financial market binds 
poor people from investing and becoming entrepreneurs. This linear relationship is 
consistent with the findings in Galor and Zeira (1993), improving the credit constraint 
can help increase income of the poor.  
 
Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2009) separate the income of a household into two 
sources: the wage income and the capital return. Accordingly, finance can affect the 
distribution of income across household by changing both the two sources of income, and 
through both the “extensive margin” and “intensive margin”. Another review given by 
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Claessens and Perotti (2007), addresses the importance of including access to finance as 
an indicator of financial development. If the access to finance fails to reach the poor 
segment as the size of the financial system increases, the upper income group can spread 
the risk to the poor, but gather most of the benefit for themselves.  
 
With these works providing a theoretical frame, it is clear that finance can affect 
the distribution of income. But to how the distribution will change is still inconclusive. 
As realized by Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2009), the distribution of income depends on 
how the investment and education opportunities spread across population. Basically, 
there is agreement on the worsening effect of credit constraint, but disagreement on 
whether this widening effect will improve as the finance system developments. If there is 
such a favorable impact, financial deepening is concluded as having negative effect on 
income inequality, or having inverted-U impact.  
 
Like the theoretical literature making contradictory predictions on the relation of 
finance and income inequality, the empirical evidences are also mixed and inconsistent. 
By constructing a panel dataset with 83 countries from 1960 to 1995, Clarke, Xu and Zou 
(2006) find favorable impact of financial deepening-- private credit and bank assets--on 
income inequality.  Both the cross sectional and panel regression results support the 
reducing-inequality effect of financial deepening. Contrary to Clarke et al (2006), Jauch 
and Watzka(2011) obtain a significant positive coefficient of finance intermediary 
development, which indicates an aggravating effect on income distribution. Regarding to 
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the link between finance and inequality, none of these research find strong evidence 
supporting the inverted-U hypothesis theorized by Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990).  
 
Rather than study the impact of finance development on the level of income 
inequality, some researches focus on its impact on poverty.  Results by Honohan (2004) 
and Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2004) suggest that the size of the financial system 
can significantly reduce the poverty ratio. However, Honohan (2004) articulates the 
importance of re-defining the development of finance. He provides a composite indictor 
of financial development, rather than the depth of credit or deposits. Contradict with the 
favorable findings, Dollar and Kraay (2003) test different determinants of growth 
together with the income of the poorest segment. Evidence implies no impact of financial 
development (i.e. commercial bank asset/total bank asset) on enhancing income of the 
poor. 
 
Similarly, Jeanneney and Kpodar (2011) and Kpodar and Singh (2011) probe the 
finance-poverty nexus in the context of the developing world. Though they both conclude 
finance is pro-poor, the former contradicts with Beck, et al. (2004) in finding credit has 
no impact in raising income of the poor. Rather, money balance (i.e. M3/GDP) is the 
channel through which financial development can help the poor in developing countries. 
Furthermore, evidence in Jeanneney and Kpodar (2011) also suggests that finance 
instability can impede the income of the poor. The latter, however, highlights on testing 
how different financial structures affect the poor. Accordingly, the impact on poverty 
from a more traditional bank based structure (i.e. stock/bank small) overweighs the 
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impact from a more market based structure (i.e. stock/bank large). However, if institution 
enhances, the market based financial sector would play a better role in alleviating poverty.  
 
With particular interest in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) area, 
Canavire-Bacarreza and Rioja (2009), test the financial expansion impact on five 
different income quintiles. Based on a GMM approach, their findings suggest that the 
expansion of private credit can increase the income of the three medium quintiles, and it 
happens only when economic growth reaches a certain critical point, which verifies the 
Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) theory.  In like fashion, Batuo et al. (2012) study the 
same question in the context of 22 African countries. Consistent with the improving 
inequality literature, they find gini-coefficients decrease as countries develop their 
financial system. 
 
Other than the LAC and Africa regional studies, special attentions are paid to 
China, India, Malaysia, Pakistan, and Brazil in the country case studies. The relationships 
uncovered, again, are different across countries. In the China’s case studies, even 
referring to the same country, results are inconsistent due to the specification of models 
and methodologies. Applying a GMM approach to 1986-2000 provincial level panel data, 
Liang (2006) finds favorable impact of financial development on income inequality in 
urban China.  Similar results are detected by Jalil and Feridum (2011), with employing 
1978 to 2006 time series data and an ARDL method. However, by utilizing a more recent 
(1996-2009) provincial data, Yu and Wei (2012) shows that financial development in 
China aggravates income inequality.  
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With a similar interest in India, Arora (2012) tests financial development with 
both urban and rural income inequalities of Indian states, and only finds a reduction 
effect in the urban area. With a time series approach, Ang (2010) concludes that financial 
deepening can reduce income inequality, but this effect can be weaken by the aggravating 
effect of financial liberalization. Furthermore, a bi-directional casual effect is noticed, 
reflecting that the income inequality may induce changes in the financial sector.        
  
Law and Tan (2009) test the same relationship in Malaysia over the years 1980 to 
2000 by adopting an ARDL approach. Though various financial variables are tested, 
there is no significant evidence supporting the effect of financial development on income 
inequality. In the Pakistan case, Shahbaz (2011) examines both the effects of financial 
development and financial instability on income inequality. With an ARDL approach, 
development of finance is verified to have reducing-effect on inequality, whereas 
instability of finance widens the inequality of income. Similarly, Bittencourt (2006) 
probes this effect in Brazil and concludes financial development as being able to equalize 
the income distribution. 
 
1.2. Data and Model 
 
This section describes the advantages of the EHII inequality dataset, financial 
variables and the methodology employed by this paper.  
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1.2.1. Data and Variables 
Following the literature, gini-coefficient is used to represent the income inequality. 
Mathematically derived through the Lorenz curve, the gini-coefficient is a statistical 
dispersion that shows how income is distributed among the population, with zero 
suggests perfect egalitarian income across individuals, and one implies absolute unequal 
distribution, i.e. one person possesses all the income. The time-series data used here is 
obtained from the EHII-Estimated Household Income Inequality Data Set (EHII), which 
is a production of the University of Texas Inequality Project (UTIP).   
 
With the help of Theil's T statistic as well as Deininger and Squire Inequality 
dataset, Galbraith and Kum (2005) derive the EHII data set. It contains 3,513 gini-
coefficients for 154 countries from the years 1963 to 2002. It offers the most continuous 
data to accommodate the time series approach proposed by this paper
1
. Taken together 
with the availability and continuity of independent variables, 16 countries are chosen to 
study.  
 
Figure 1.1 plots each country’s gini-coefficient independently. According to the 
time path of the variable, the trends can be roughly categorized into tree types. The gini-
coefficients in Denmark, Greece and Finland are undergoing very mild changes. 
Countries like Turkey, Norway, Canada, Kenya, Israel, India, Bolivia, U.S., Australia and 
Belgium have an obvious increasing trend in their gini-coefficients. Contrarily, Japan, 
Italy and Singapore experienced declining inequality over the time span we study. 
                                                          
1
 The time period studied for each country with each financial indicator is different as the variables are 
jointly available in different times across countries. 
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The key variables in this paper are financial development indicators. Five 
different variables are used separately as proxies of financial development. To examine 
the credit mechanism, ratio of private credit to GDP and ratio of bank asset to GDP are 
employed. Ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP and ratio of financial system deposits to GDP 
are used to investigate the liquidity channel. In almost all the empirical research on 
financial development and inequality, private credit is the most relied variable to 
represent financial intermediary development. Beck et al (2000) and Beck and Kunt 
(2009) describe this variable as capable of capturing the activity and allocation of credit 
in the private sector. However, according to Mckinon (1973), the deposits could also 
provide opportunities for individuals and corporations to smooth consumption or achieve 
self-finance. This might be essentially important to the low-income group that is more 
likely to face credit constraints. 
 
The fifth financial indicator I adopted is the ratio of bank credit to bank deposit. 
Rather than demonstrating the size or depth of financial sector, this ratio is rather 
complex. To some degree, this ratio shows how efficient the bank deposit is transferred 
into credit. But if credit is much higher than deposit, it may suggest potential instability 
of the financial sector. 
 
With such wide-ranging series included in the estimation, different characteristics 
of financial deepening can be accommodated. In addition, real GDP per capita, consumer 
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price index, share of government expenditure in GDP and share of international trade in 
GDP are used as control variables
2
.  
 
1.2.2. Model and Estimation 
An error correction model is used to test both the long-run and short-run effects of 
financial development on income inequality. If redefining the inverted-U relationship as a 
confliction between long-run and short-run coefficients, this method accommodates the 
intentions of testing this hypothesis. Unlike past empirical works dealing with the 
nonlinear relationships, a squared term of finance or income cannot be added in this 
model. 
 
The following equation is the reduced form of the model: 
( , , )GN f FD Y CV                                                                                                    (1)                                                                                                 
Where GN is gini-coefficient, FD denotes each financial development indiator, Y is the 
GDP per capita and CV represents a set of control variables--consumer price index (PI), 
government consumption (Gov_cons) and Trade openness (Trade).  To analyze the long-
run effect, a log-linear equation is built as:  
0 1 2 3 4 5_i i i i i i iLnGini LnFD LnY LnPI LnGov cons LnTrade                    (2) 
 
Similar to Ang (2010), this empirical model assumes that the income distribution 
depends on financial development (FD), trade openness (Trade), income (Y) and price 
                                                          
2 Detailed data source is listed in Appendix of chapter 1. 
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(PI).
3
 Furthermore, the ratio of government expenditure to GDP (Gov_cons) is also added 
to include the possible distributional effect of government expenditure. Special attention 
should be paid to the financial coefficient
1 . A negative sign implies a reducing-
inequality effect of financial development in the long-run, whereas positive sign suggests 
a worsening-inequality effect in the long run.  
According to Kuznets (1955), economic development in the long-run can equalize 
the income distribution. Thus the increasing in GDP per capita and trade openness should 
be able to reduce inequality, which means that the related coefficients-, 2  and 5 -are 
expected to be negative. On the other hand, since “inflation hurts the poor more than it 
hurts the rich” (Easterly and Fischer 2001), 3 is expected to be positive,.  Clarke, Xu and 
Zou (2006) indicate that the effect of government consumption on income inequality is 
ambiguous, and the sign of 4 is not quite clear. 
 
To estimate this model in a cointegration framework, this paper uses the bound 
testing approach. According to Pesaran et al. (2001), this approach allows users to test 
multivariable cointegrations without the integration order restrictions
4
. Thus unit root test 
is no longer a preparatory step in estimations. Given the definition of FD, coefficient α1 
will be given the most attention among all the empirical results. To be more specific, 
negative value would suggest that finance development improves income distribution in 
the long run, and positive means worsening the inequality. 
                                                          
3
 However, instead of using real GDP growth, and inflation rate like Ang (2010), this model employs GDP 
per capita (Y) and consumer price index (PI) to capture the income and price effect. 
 
4 In the econometrics literature, Engle-Granger (1987) and Johanse & Juselius (1990) both propose cointegration 
methodologies require that data series to be I(1), i.e. integrated of order one or stationary after taking first difference, 
and require the error term to be I(0). 
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Considering the short-run effects of finance on inequality, this thesis extends this 
bounding testing procedure to an error-correction model (ECM) framework. The 
following ECM equation is established by solving 
i  from equation (2); lagging it with 
one period; and incorporate with the error correction terminology:  
1 2 3 4 5
0 1 2 3 4 5
1 0 0 0 0
6
6 0 1 1 1 2 1 3 1 4 1 5 1
0
_
_
n n n n n
i k i k k i k k i k k i k k i k
k k k k k
n
k i k i i i i i i i
k
LnGN LnGN LnFD LnY LnPI LnGov cons
LnTrade LnGN LnFD LnY LnPI LnGov cons LnTrade
     
       
    
    
      

           
        
    

  (3) 
Where Δ denotes a first difference operator and βk captures the short-run effect of 
each variable. Special attention is paid to 2k  in order to investigate the possible 
inverted-U relationship between financial development and the gini-index. If significant 
positive sign on 2k and negative sign on 1  are observed, we can conclude that financial 
development deteriorates income distribution in the short-run, but improves it in the long-
run.  The estimation first requires selecting optimum lags for each variable, thus Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC) is used after initially introducing a maximum length of four 
lags
5
. With the optimum lags selected, coefficients in equation (3) can be successfully 
estimated. 
 
 The last step requires replacing the lagged level terms with a lagged error 
correction term (ECMt-1) in the above equation. It is a linear combination of the lagged 
                                                          
5
 In some regressions, maximum of three lags maybe introduced due to the relatively shorter data series. 
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variables in equation (3) and calculated based on the estimations of 
s (s=0,1,…,5). The 
significance and negative of ECMt-1 not only suggests cointigration, but also explains the 
speed of adjustment toward long-run equalibrium. Finally equation (4) is established with 
φ being the coefficient on the error correction term. 
1 2 3 4
0 1 2 3 4
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5 6
5 6 1
0 0
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n n n n
it k it k k it k k it k k it k
k k k k
n n
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  
 
         
     
   
 
                     (4) 
 
Two tests are performed to verify the long-run relationship. First, to test the null 
hypothesis of all δs equaling to zero, the standard F statistics is used in this approach. But 
new critical values are adopted following Pesaran et al. (2001). If the calculated F value 
in estimation is greater than the upper bound critical value, cointergration is successfully 
established. However, if the value is smaller than the lower bound critical value or lies 
between the upper and lower bounds, the conclusion is no cointegration or inconclusive. 
The second test is a simple t-test on the ECMt-1 term. A significantly negative   implies 
that all variables are correcting the changes toward the long run equilibrium.  
            Other than F statistic and ECM coefficient, several other distinctive tests or 
statistics are reported to further diagnose the model. First, adjusted R square is provided 
to state how well the model fits the data series. Second, residual serial correlation is 
tested with the Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test. Third, Ramsey’s RESET test for model 
specification is applied. Fourth, a Normality test is adopted to check if the residuals are 
normally distributed. Moreover, the last three test statistics all have a χ2 distribution. Thus 
if calculated values smaller than critical values suggest model specification, normality 
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and no serial correlation in residuals. Last but not least, concerning the stability of this 
model, CUSUM and CUSUMSQ tests results are also reported. 
 
1.4. Empirical Results 
Diverse effects are observed across countries as well as across different financial 
indicators. Based on results in the short-run panel, in most cases, at least one of the 
coefficients on the lagged difference terms is significant (at the 10% level)
 6
. Short-run 
coefficient on private credit is found to be significant in 15 countries. Analogously, such 
significance for bank asset, liquid liabilities, bank deposit and credit to deposit ratio is 
found to be 13, 14, 14 and 15 respectively. Similar significances are observed in GDP per 
capita, trade openness, price index as well as government consumption. Thus, in the 
short-run, all the independent variables have implication on income inequality. 
 
The remaining of this section explains the long-run results by categorizing 
countries into four groups according the financial coefficients. Only favorable effects of 
finance on inequality are detected in Denmark, Turkey and Kenya; mixed effects are seen 
in Norway, Canada, Israel and Greece; pure worsening effects are discovered in India, 
Japan, Bolivia, U.S.; and no significant effect is found in Australia, Belgium, Italy, 
Finland and Singapore. 
 
Denmark Turkey and Kenya 
                                                          
6
 Each of the 16 countries includes 5 regressions, which times up to 90 in total. Short-run insignificance of 
coefficients on GDP per capita is found in 4/90 cases; trade openness is found in 0/90 cases; price index is 
found in 9/90 cases; government consumption is found in 8/90 cases. 
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In Denmark, Turkey and Kenya, only long-run favorable effect is observed from 
financial development. Specifically, all the four financial deepening coefficients show 
negative and significant signs in Denmark (Table 1), with the coefficient of liquid 
liability approximately five times larger than private credit, bank deposit and bank asset.  
If defining the inverted-U relationship as having aggravating-inequality effect in the 
short-run alongside improving-inequality effect in the long-run, it is confirmed by the 
short-run results related to bank asset in Denmark since two of the lagged difference bank 
asset coefficients are significantly positive. 
 
In the diagnostics part, again, all of the ECMt-1 coefficients are significantly 
negative except for the regression with last column. This suggests that models are 
correcting toward their long run equilibrium.  Furthermore, four of the calculated F 
statistics are all above the critical values at 1% level, which indicates cointegration 
among variables. The data fits well as the five adjusted R
2
s are in the range of 0.73 to 
0.91. Lastly, all the five estimations pass the CUSUM and CUSUMSQ tests, which 
shows the stability of models. 
 
The long-run reducing-inequality effect is seen only in the cointegration 
associated with bank asset variables in Turkey (Table 2) and Kenya (Table 3), which 
suggest that increasing the bank asset can help reduce the income inequality. However, 
no inverted-U relationship can be identified in these two countries. 
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Concerning the other control variables, results are not consistent across the three 
countries. Only one of the long-run coefficient on government consumption is negative 
and significant in Denmark, while coefficients associated with other control variables 
occasionally show worsening-inequality effect. In Turkey and Kenya, this favorable 
control variable is GDP per capita, suggesting that economic growth can help reduce 
inequality.  
 
Norway, Canada, Israel and Greece 
In Norway’s case (Table 4), long-run effects of financial deepening are significant 
but mixed. Evidence shows that the private credit and bank asset can both reduce income 
inequality, whereas liquid liability and bank deposit tend to aggravate inequality. Similar 
to Norway, In Canada (Table 5), long-run favorable impact from finance is only observed 
in the cointegration associated with private credit. Combining with positive signs 
observed in the short-run financial coefficients, the inverted-U relationship is verified in 
this case. It suggests that private credit in the short-term worsens income inequality, but 
in the long-run improves the distribution of income. Evidences on liquid liabilities and 
bank deposit both imply significant worsening impacts. 
 
Long-run mixed results in Israel (Table 6) and Greece (Table 7) on financial 
deepening are just the opposite of Norway and Canada. Rather than reducing inequality, 
expanding private credit can adversely affect income distribution in Greece and Israel, 
and this effect is much larger in Greece (0.19) than in the other countries (0.08). Liquid 
liability and bank deposit are shown as capable of reducing inequality in Greece and 
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Israel respectively. Nonetheless, the result on bank deposit verifies the inverted-U 
hypothesis in Israel. 
 
India, Japan, Bolivia, U.S. 
Although short-run results sometimes suggest financial development can help 
reduce income inequality, only worsening effect is observed in India, Japan, Bolivia and 
U.S. in the long-run results.  
 
In India (Table 8) all the four long-run financial deepening coefficients are 
positive and significant, implying that financial deepening worsens the income inequality. 
This finding contradicts with Ang (2010), in which the empirical results suggest that 
financial deepening improves income inequality. The difference in control variables and 
time periods studied might contribute to the contradicting effects shown in this chapter 
and Ang (2010)
7
.  As Ang (2010) also states that financial liberalization worsens 
inequality in India, the aggravating-inequality impact found here might induced by 
excessive financial liberalization policies used in India during the periods studied. 
 
 
Similarly, results in Japan (Table 9) and Bolivia (Table 10) imply that income 
distribution worsens not only through the credit channel but also through the deposit 
channel. All the four deepening coefficients in Japan are positive and significant. In 
                                                          
7
 Different from Ang(2010), the regression model in this chapter uses leveled GDP per capita instead of the 
growth rate; also the model in this chapter includes government consumption to control for the government 
expenditure effect. 
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Bolivia, three out of four-- the coefficients on private credit, bank asset and liquid 
liabilities are significant and positive.  
 
In the case of USA (Table 11), only coefficient on bank asset is significant and 
suggests a similar aggravating effect on inequality. However, GDP per capita and 
Government consumption have positive roles in improving income distribution, since 
four out of five coefficients on GDP per capita and three out of five coefficients on 
government consumptions are negative and significant.  
 
Australia, Belgium, Italy, Finland and Singapore 
Results in Australia (Table 12), Belgium (Table 13), Italy (Table 14), Finland 
(Table 15) and Singapore (Table 16) show no significant relationship between finance 
and income distribution in the long-run. Furthermore, in the Finland’s case, none of the 
cointegrations are successfully established: three out of five failed the F test, whereas the 
other two presents a positive error correction term. Turning to control variables, trade 
openness is the only factor that can reduce income inequality in the long-run. Especially 
in Australia, all the five coefficients on trade openness are negative and significant. 
Effects from economic growth, government consumption and prices are mixed. To be 
more specific, except for Italy and Singapore, the significant coefficients of price index 
are all positive, suggesting an aggravating effect from inflation.  
 
In the short-run results of Australia, at least one lagged significant coefficient is 
obtained for each financial variable. The negative signs of these coefficients suggest that 
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financial deepening is able to reduce income inequality in the short-run. Similarly, short-
run results show that financial deepening in Belgium and Italy, measured by private 
credit, bank asset, liquid liability and bank deposit, can reduce inequality. In Singapore, 
the short-run favorable impact is only observed from the ratio of credit to deposit. 
 
1.5. Conclusions 
Based on the well-established literature on the positive effect of financial 
development on economic growth, a few studies further investigate the role of finance in 
shaping the distribution of income. However, almost all the previous works draw 
conclusion based on cross-country and panel regressions, which tend to suffer from 
aggregation bias and sample selection bias. This paper uses time-series model to examine 
the finance-inequality nexus in 16 countries. Not only we provide country-specific effects, 
but impacts from different measures of financial deepening are studied.  
 
The result not only shows diverse effects of finance on inequality across the 16 
countries, but also implies that the credit channel and deposit channel can affect 
inequality differently. Expanding credit or bank asset can help reduce inequality in 
Denmark, Turkey, Kenya, Norway and Canada; whereas increasing the liquidity and 
deposit shows similar impacts in Denmark, Israel and Greece. Policy makers in these 
countries should consider policies that can further promote financial deepening. For 
example, policies aimed at liberalizing the financial system-- reducing entry barriers, 
interest rate and capital controls-- might be appropriate. However, for countries show 
mixed effects, financial policies should be well designed and used with cautious to 
prevent the worsening-distribution effect off sets the beneficial effect.  
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As financial deepening aggravates the income distribution in India, Japan, Bolivia, 
Malta and the United State, policy makers should re-consider their financial liberalization 
policies. Even though this type of policy can expand credit and stimulate economic 
growth in these countries, it cannot promote shared prosperity. Instead, prudential 
reforms and supervision might be necessary in their financial system.  
Given that the EHII inequality dataset ends at early 2000, the impact of financial 
deepening on inequality might change in recent decade. Future study can thus explore 
more recent and continuous database on gini-coefficient and studies the same nexus. 
Furthermore, the inequality-improving effect through other characteristic of finance can 
also be investigated via the time series approach.
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Figure 1: The Gini-coefficients 
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Figure 1 (continued) 
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Table 1: Denmark 
Denmark Private credit Bank asset Liquid liabilities Bank deposit Credit/deposit 
Short-run      
ΔLnGNt-1 2.05(2.93)** 2.51(6.88)*** 0.24(1.99)* 2.03(7.13)*** -1.06(6.86)*** 
ΔLnGNt-2 1.33(2.71)** 1.55(5.56)*** - 1.29(7.54)*** -0.73(4.56)*** 
ΔLnGNt-3 0.23(0.91) 0.51(3.04)** - - -0.63(4.77)*** 
ΔLnY 0.00(0.70) 0.00(1.13) -0.01(5.93)*** 0.00(2.52)** 0.00(1.37) 
ΔLnYt-1 0.01(1.19) 0.01(5.60)*** -0.02(8.37)*** -0.02(6.81)*** 0.00(2.22)** 
ΔLnYt-2 0.00(0.40) - -0.01(6.89)*** -0.01(3.17)** - 
ΔLnYt-3 0.00(0.03) - -0.01(6.31)*** - - 
ΔLnFD -0.14(2.41)** -0.34(8.15)*** -0.24(7.29)*** -0.08(2.73)** -0.14(6.41)*** 
ΔLnFDt-1 0.15(1.77) 0.09(2.04)* 0.49(7.01)*** 0.08(1.86)* 0.04(1.25) 
ΔLnFDt-2 -0.08(0.80) 0.06(1.12) -0.29(7.51)*** -0.40(6.49)*** 0.12(4.26)*** 
ΔLnFDt-3 0.07(1.24) 0.19(5.67)*** -0.20(3.97)*** 0.06(1.47) 0.05(2.20)** 
ΔLnTrade -0.34(3.56)*** 0.04(0.82) -0.22(9.60)*** -0.18(4.37)*** -0.45(7.25)*** 
ΔLnTradet-1 0.25(2.19)* -0.27(3.66)*** -0.20(5.43)*** -0.04(0.81) 0.35(6.62)*** 
ΔLnTradet-2 0.02(0.16) -0.05(0.98) -0.35(9.15)*** -0.44(7.43)*** - 
ΔLnTradet-3 0.00(0.03) -0.14(3.33)*** -0.21(4.97)*** -0.39(6.39)*** - 
ΔLnPI 0.14(0.68) -0.03(0.29) -0.75(8.40)*** -0.81(6.43)*** 0.40(2.83)** 
ΔLnPIt-1 0.05(0.21) 0.13(0.98) -0.39(2.79)** -0.18(1.18) 0.16(1.15) 
ΔLnPIt-2 -0.17(0.69) -0.52(4.55)*** 0.62(5.35)*** 0.40(2.77)** - 
ΔLnPIt-3 0.06(0.33) - -0.27(3.90)*** 0.23(2.33)** - 
ΔLnGov_Cons 0.23(2.51)** 0.25(5.22)*** 0.32(8.24)*** 0.53(8.23)*** -0.07(0.87) 
ΔLnGov_Const-1 0.02(0.17) 0.27(3.72)*** 0.48(5.78)*** -0.09(1.31) -0.11(1.34) 
ΔLnGov_Const-2 0.24(1.78) 0.20(3.46)*** 0.22(4.87)*** 0.39(5.46)*** 0.17(1.87)* 
ΔLnGov_Const-3 0.25(1.88) 0.13(2.37)** 0.15(3.99)*** 0.33(5.32)*** 0.23(3.74)*** 
Long-run      
LnY 0.00(0.83) 0.00(1.99) 0.01(3.01)** 0.01(3.43)** 0.01(0.34) 
LnFD -0.05(3.05)** -0.06(6.27)*** -0.29(5.87)*** -0.05(2.54)* 0.11(0.50) 
LnTrade -0.06(1.30) 0.09(2.29)* 0.02(0.25) 0.11(1.64) 0.60(0.77) 
LnPI 0.03(2.55)** 0.01(1.02) 0.09(3.72)** 0.01(0.39) -0.13(0.91) 
LnGov_Cons -0.03(0.85) 0.01(0.20) -0.20(3.33)** 0.03(0.65) 0.33(0.99) 
Constant 3.85(18.56)*** 3.25(15.46)*** 4.78(8.86)*** 2.92(7.56)*** -0.16(0.03) 
Diagnostics      
F Statistic 0.80 5.70** 7.47** 6.84** 5.24** 
ECMt-1 -3.03(3.95)*** -4.53(8.27)*** -2.62(10.04)*** -3.23(9.61)*** 0.63(7.15)*** 
Adj. R2 0.73 0.91 0.97 0.93 0.86 
LM 6.47 1.36 5.01 9.88 10.76 
RESET 8.56 2.49 1.36 1.84 2.38 
Normality 1.22 0.42 0.57 1.35 1.05 
CUSUM s s s s s 
CUSUMSQ s s s s s 
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Table 2: Turkey 
Turkey Private credit Bank asset Liquid liabilities Bank deposit Credit/deposit 
Short-run      
ΔLnGNt-1 -0.62(9.28)*** -0.26(2.87)** -1.86(18.57)*** -1.71(11.41)*** -1.05(7.58)*** 
ΔLnGNt-2 -0.37(6.48)*** -0.24(3.74)*** -0.88(12.92)*** -0.81(7.50)*** -0.92(5.88)*** 
ΔLnGNt-3 - - - - -0.64(4.76)*** 
ΔLnY 0.01(8.44)*** 0.01(7.11)*** 0.02(13.32)*** 0.02(7.38)*** 0.01(4.34)*** 
ΔLnYt-1 0.01(5.65)*** 0.00(2.36)** 0.01(5.28)*** 0.00(1.11) 0.00(1.85)* 
ΔLnYt-2 0.01(6.65)*** 0.01(4.70)*** 0.01(8.36)*** 0.01(4.07)*** 0.00(1.82)* 
ΔLnYt-3 - - - - - 
ΔLnFD -0.15(8.17)*** -0.14(6.30)*** -0.14(7.30)*** -0.05(2.52)** 0.00(0.27) 
ΔLnFDt-1 0.06(3.46)*** -0.03(1.76) -0.06(4.99)*** -0.07(3.10)** -0.04(3.65)*** 
ΔLnFDt-2 -0.02(1.22) -0.03(2.16)* -0.06(3.59)*** -0.07(3.46)*** -0.08(5.07)*** 
ΔLnFDt-3 - - - - -0.03(2.03)* 
ΔLnTrade -0.08(8.82)*** -0.06(7.02)*** -0.11(13.46)*** -0.10(6.71)*** -0.04(2.82)** 
ΔLnTradet-1 -0.03(2.72)** 0.07(3.74)*** 0.01(1.41) 0.03(1.87)* -0.04(2.85)** 
ΔLnTradet-2 - 0.06(2.33)** 0.08(6.51)*** 0.11(4.90)*** 0.01(0.41) 
ΔLnTradet-3 - - - - 0.03(1.93)* 
ΔLnPI 0.04(3.06)** -0.02(1.46) 0.02(1.22) -0.01(0.27) 0.07(3.65)*** 
ΔLnPIt-1 0.07(4.38)*** 0.00(0.16) 0.10(5.73)*** 0.08(3.24)*** 0.21(7.65)*** 
ΔLnPIt-2 -0.03(2.75)** -0.09(2.79)** -0.16(9.49)*** -0.18(6.18)*** 0.14(4.03)*** 
ΔLnPIt-3 - - - - - 
ΔLnGov_Cons 0.07(4.76)*** 0.06(3.02)** 0.01(0.37) -0.02(0.86) -0.11(4.69)*** 
ΔLnGov_Const-1 0.06(3.47)*** 0.14(3.88)*** 0.27(9.61)*** 0.30(6.46)*** 0.24(10.11)*** 
ΔLnGov_Const-2 - 0.02(1.36) - 0.04(2.05)* 0.32(6.69)*** 
ΔLnGov_Const-3 - - - - 0.15(4.62)*** 
Long-run - - - - - 
LnY 0.01(0.28) 0.01(0.77) -0.02(4.11)*** -0.03(2.38)* 0.01(1.26) 
LnFD -0.54(0.72) -0.14(2.51)* 0.09(1.83) 0.02(0.93) -0.08(1.17) 
LnTrade -0.28(0.55) -0.21(1.50) 0.17(4.15)*** 0.15(2.72)* -0.19(1.89) 
LnPI 0.03(0.87) 0.04(2.30)* -0.01(1.78) -0.01(1.11) 0.01(2.15)* 
LnGov_Cons -0.19(0.32) -0.10(0.59) 0.32(6.72)*** 0.31(4.48)** -0.21(1.29) 
Constant 6.56(1.38) 5.22(5.46)*** 2.31(6.02)*** 2.60(6.63)*** 4.99(5.81)*** 
Diagnostics      
F Statistic 11.70*** 4.32* 18.83*** 5.80* 6.95** 
ECMt-1 -0.29(11.35)*** -1.01(7.63)*** 1.28(15.03)*** 1.25(8.85)*** -0.88(8.75)*** 
Adj. R2 0.97 0.97 0.98 0.95 0.93 
LM 8.06 5.36 18.71 16.70 12.70 
RESET 6.11 4.71 3.19 2.29 0.11 
Normality 0.92 0.42 2.68 2.19 1.06 
CUSUM s s s s s 
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Table 3: Kenya 
Kenya Private credit Bank asset Liquid liabilities Bank deposit Credit/deposit 
Short-run      
ΔLnGNt-1 0.19(1.09) 0.99(2.87)*** 4.33(8.55)*** - 0.50(1.78)* 
ΔLnGNt-2 - 0.52(2.42)** 2.78(7.28)*** - 0.21(1.16) 
ΔLnGNt-3 - - 0.96(3.83)*** - - 
ΔLnY -0.01(1.71)* -0.02(2.62)** -0.02(3.85)*** -0.02(3.15)*** -0.01(1.79)* 
ΔLnYt-1 - - 0.15(10.03)*** - - 
ΔLnYt-2 - - 0.10(8.58)*** - - 
ΔLnYt-3 - - 0.05(7.09)*** - - 
ΔLnFD 0.04(0.39) -0.29(3.08)*** -0.51(5.54)*** -0.20(1.89)* 0.02(0.19) 
ΔLnFDt-1 - - -0.36(5.57)*** -0.33(2.93)*** - 
ΔLnFDt-2 - - -0.50(7.04)*** -0.35(3.30)*** - 
ΔLnFDt-3 - - -0.40(5.76)*** -0.44(4.26)*** - 
ΔLnTrade 0.11(1.64) 0.03(0.39) -0.11(1.77) 0.29(4.58)*** 0.04(0.58) 
ΔLnTradet-1 0.14(2.01)* 0.14(2.18)** 0.48(7.14)*** - 0.14(1.88)* 
ΔLnTradet-2 - - 0.28(4.61)*** - - 
ΔLnTradet-3 - - - - - 
ΔLnPI -0.58(4.36)*** -0.27(1.96)* 0.13(1.02) -0.13(1.11) -0.41(3.43)*** 
ΔLnPIt-1 - -0.16(1.14) 0.27(1.93)* - - 
ΔLnPIt-2 - - 0.11(1.04) - - 
ΔLnPIt-3 - - 0.46(4.76)*** - - 
ΔLnGov_Cons 0.04(0.32) 0.26(1.76)* -0.24(2.42)** 0.05(0.34) 0.07(0.47) 
ΔLnGov_Const-1 - - -0.78(4.61)*** 0.47(3.30)*** - 
ΔLnGov_Const-2 - - -0.62(3.75)*** - - 
ΔLnGov_Const-3 - - -0.31(2.51)** - - 
Long-run      
LnY 0.00(1.34) -0.01(2.86)*** -0.03(4.14)** -0.02(2.98)*** -0.01(1.93)* 
LnFD 0.05(1.51) -0.07(2.60)** -0.12(1.68) 0.16(1.53) 0.01(0.32) 
LnTrade -0.03(0.76) -0.06(1.86)* -0.12(3.67)** 0.14(1.42) -0.06(1.31) 
LnPI -0.03(3.79)*** -0.01(1.31) -0.01(2.13) -0.06(2.83)*** -0.02(6.35)*** 
LnGov_Cons 0.03(0.51) 0.14(4.13)*** 0.13(3.98)** -0.13(0.81) 0.09(2.15)** 
Constant 3.84(15.70)*** 3.98(23.93)*** 4.59(16.70)*** 3.41(6.70)*** 3.88(12.11)*** 
Diagnostics      
F Statistic 4.71*** 4.59*** 7.28* 5.86*** 3.97*** 
ECMt-1 -1.67(5.67)*** -2.62(5.76)*** -6.59(10.80)*** -1.07(6.56)*** -2.02(5.33)*** 
Adj. R2 0.61 0.68 0.93 0.66 0.61 
LM 2.77 2.64 0.19 2.38 1.25 
RESET 1.21 6.77 2.55 4.10 0.52 
Normality 122.63 24.62 0.34 29.06 108.79 
CUSUM s s s s s 
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Table 4: Norway 
Norway Private credit Bank asset Liquid liabilities Bank deposit Credit/deposit 
Short-run      
ΔLnGNt-1 -0.01(0.07) - 1.66(4.14)*** 0.31(2.34)** 0.25(1.75) 
ΔLnGNt-2 -0.24(2.49)** - 0.97(3.51)*** - -0.35(2.50)** 
ΔLnGNt-3 - - 0.57(3.58)*** - - 
ΔLnY 0.00(0.29) 0.01(2.37)** -0.01(4.19)*** -0.01(4.10)*** -0.01(1.11) 
ΔLnYt-1 - -0.01(3.26)*** - - 0.02(3.71)*** 
ΔLnYt-2 - - - - 0.02(2.91)** 
ΔLnYt-3 - - - - 0.01(2.58)** 
ΔLnFD -0.34(3.29)*** -0.43(6.02)*** 0.02(0.11) -0.02(0.18) -0.35(3.83)*** 
ΔLnFDt-1 - - -1.23(4.79)*** -0.60(3.67)*** 0.16(1.47) 
ΔLnFDt-2 - - -1.05(3.39)*** -0.30(1.88)* -0.17(2.28)** 
ΔLnFDt-3 - - -1.00(4.01)*** -0.46(3.14)*** - 
ΔLnTrade -0.04(0.44) -0.33(3.54)*** -0.43(3.14)*** -0.20(1.87)* -0.30(2.66)** 
ΔLnTradet-1 0.31(2.80)** 0.03(0.36) - - 0.63(3.82)*** 
ΔLnTradet-2 - -0.39(4.16)*** - - -0.36(1.98)* 
ΔLnTradet-3 - -0.28(2.88)*** - - 0.35(1.82)* 
ΔLnPI 0.69(4.21)*** 0.41(2.48)** 0.51(2.37)** 0.43(2.28)** 0.27(1.51) 
ΔLnPIt-1 -0.36(1.77)* -0.24(1.14) 0.02(0.09) 0.01(0.05) 0.08(0.33) 
ΔLnPIt-2 0.16(0.76) -0.09(0.42) -0.01(0.05) 0.34(1.46) 0.10(0.38) 
ΔLnPIt-3 -1.30(7.27)*** -0.97(5.34)*** -0.67(2.98)*** -0.98(4.73)*** -1.17(5.42)*** 
ΔLnGov_Cons 0.50(2.92)*** 0.33(2.42)** -1.02(4.26)*** -0.25(1.42) -0.36(1.85)* 
ΔLnGov_Const-1 0.65(4.03)*** - 0.45(2.01)* 0.33(1.67) 0.85(4.55)*** 
ΔLnGov_Const-2 0.58(3.31)*** - -0.10(0.44) 0.37(1.82)* 0.11(0.44) 
ΔLnGov_Const-3 0.61(3.84)*** - 0.74(3.56)*** 0.64(3.45)*** 0.77(2.79)** 
Long-run      
LnY 0.01(0.94) 0.04(2.99)*** 0.00(1.80)* -0.01(1.88)* -0.02(0.99) 
LnFD -0.28(2.75)** -0.16(2.43)** 0.27(3.18)*** 0.25(2.12)* -0.11(1.30) 
LnTrade -0.31(1.90)* -0.14(0.65) -0.06(0.92) 0.05(0.44) -0.21(0.73) 
LnPI 0.14(2.48)** 0.03(1.14) 0.05(3.41)*** 0.01(0.42) 0.14(2.45)** 
LnGov_Cons 0.00(0.03) 0.31(3.01)*** -0.22(2.44)** -0.05(0.51) -0.29(1.44) 
Constant 5.42(5.64)*** 3.38(3.12)*** 3.20(7.24)*** 2.52(3.84)*** 5.45(4.27)*** 
Diagnostics      
F Statistic 9.54*** 10.15*** 4.18** 8.48*** 5.21** 
ECMt-1 -1.04(8.72)*** -1.03(8.93)*** -3.13(6.04)*** -1.67(8.33)*** -1.32(7.32)*** 
Adj. R2 0.84 0.83 0.76 0.80 0.85 
LM 6.86 3.76 0.74 2.33 20.01 
RESET 0.25 0.37 0.05 0.14 0.50 
Normality 0.55 3.23 2.03 1.35 0.04 
CUSUM s s s s s 
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Table 5: Canada 
Canada Private credit Bank asset Liquid liabilities Bank deposit Credit/deposit 
Short-run      
ΔLnGNt-1 1.05(7.16)*** 0.09(0.54) - - 0.81(6.53)*** 
ΔLnGNt-2 0.92(6.34)*** -0.33(2.09)* - - -0.53(3.36)*** 
ΔLnGNt-3 0.68(3.91)*** 0.33(1.72) - - 0.77(4.35)*** 
ΔLnY 0.00(5.82)*** 0.01(4.91)*** 0.01(5.66)*** 0.01(5.14)*** 0.00(1.82)* 
ΔLnYt-1 - 0.03(6.10)*** 0.01(6.48)*** 0.01(7.00)*** 0.02(8.15)*** 
ΔLnYt-2 - 0.02(6.07)*** 0.01(5.69)*** 0.01(5.89)*** 0.02(8.43)*** 
ΔLnYt-3 - 0.01(5.15)*** 0.00(3.99)*** 0.00(4.12)*** 0.01(4.72)*** 
ΔLnFD -0.06(3.91)*** 0.09(3.21)*** 0.00(0.29) 0.00(0.19) -0.12(3.57)*** 
ΔLnFDt-1 0.07(2.81)** - -0.16(3.06)*** -0.14(2.79)** 0.38(5.91)*** 
ΔLnFDt-2 0.07(2.44)** - -0.24(4.74)*** -0.21(4.33)*** -0.11(2.36)** 
ΔLnFDt-3 -0.04(1.80)* - -0.21(4.47)*** -0.20(4.28)*** 0.43(5.32)*** 
ΔLnTrade -0.03(1.12) -0.21(4.52)*** -0.10(3.35)*** -0.10(3.12)*** -0.24(5.91)*** 
ΔLnTradet-1 -0.10(3.46)*** 0.04(1.07) 0.08(2.54)** 0.09(2.54)** 0.07(2.19)* 
ΔLnTradet-2 - 0.01(0.34) - - -0.21(4.36)*** 
ΔLnTradet-3 - -0.11(2.53)** - - -0.09(2.45)** 
ΔLnPI 0.31(3.97)*** -0.14(1.37) -0.08(1.15) -0.11(1.60) -0.44(4.15)*** 
ΔLnPIt-1 -0.55(5.38)*** -0.72(4.96)*** -0.27(2.63)** -0.26(2.41)** -0.78(6.86)*** 
ΔLnPIt-2 - 0.46(2.78)** 0.33(4.31)*** 0.30(3.75)*** 0.41(2.85)** 
ΔLnPIt-3 - -0.19(1.50) - - -0.39(3.74)*** 
ΔLnGov_Cons 0.14(3.99)*** 0.03(0.60) 0.00(0.11) 0.01(0.35) -0.04(0.69) 
ΔLnGov_Const-1 - -0.21(3.54)*** 0.00(0.06) 0.00(0.00) 0.01(0.13) 
ΔLnGov_Const-2 - 0.01(0.18) 0.13(3.24)*** 0.14(3.13)*** -0.44(4.92)*** 
ΔLnGov_Const-3 - -0.26(4.84)*** - - -0.16(3.75)*** 
Long-run      
LnY 0.00(3.09)*** -0.08(0.40) 0.00(0.12) 0.00(0.26) -0.01(0.31) 
LnFD -0.14(6.01)*** 0.85(0.40) 0.63(3.47)*** 0.58(3.18)*** -0.08(0.19) 
LnTrade 0.08(5.16)*** -0.42(0.38) -0.14(1.97)* -0.13(1.77) 0.01(0.02) 
LnPI 0.12(7.19)*** -0.39(0.39) -0.12(2.69)** -0.12(2.50)** 0.01(0.20) 
LnGov_Cons 0.09(3.68)*** 1.30(0.48) -0.19(1.55) -0.16(1.26) 0.54(1.64) 
Constant 3.08(28.89)*** 0.17(0.02) 2.61(6.87)*** 2.79(7.11)*** 2.42(4.59)*** 
Diagnostics      
F Statistic 8.83*** 4.07** 7.89*** 7.01*** 5.80** 
ECMt-1 -1.53(8.40)*** -0.19(6.30)*** -0.58(8.19)*** -0.56(7.72)*** -0.87(8.34)*** 
Adj. R2 0.77 0.67 0.78 0.75 0.82 
LM 2.61 4.82 1.96 1.05 1.65 
RESET 6.40 3.30 1.98 1.92 2.44 
Normality 2.57 0.38 1.31 1.18 1.01 
CUSUM s s s s s 
CUSUMSQ s s s s s 
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Table 6: Israel 
Israel Private credit Bank asset Liquid liabilities Bank deposit Credit/deposit 
Short-run      
ΔLnGNt-1 0.72(4.13)*** 0.07(0.56) 0.48(3.72)*** 0.53(3.26)*** 0.66(6.40)*** 
ΔLnGNt-2 0.09(0.65) -0.48(3.99)*** - 0.01(0.05) - 
ΔLnGNt-3 -0.50(3.98)*** -0.51(3.71)*** - 0.33(2.21)** - 
ΔLnY 0.02(6.32)*** 0.01(4.20)*** 0.01(5.43)*** 0.01(4.15)*** 0.01(7.70)*** 
ΔLnYt-1 -0.03(4.59)*** 0.01(3.32)*** 0.01(5.17)*** 0.01(5.27)*** -0.01(7.06)*** 
ΔLnYt-2 -0.02(4.97)*** 0.00(1.17) 0.01(3.45)*** 0.01(4.94)*** -0.01(6.69)*** 
ΔLnYt-3 -0.01(2.81)** 0.01(2.82)** 0.01(5.88)*** 0.01(6.73)*** - 
ΔLnFD 0.06(1.38) 0.05(1.46) -0.01(0.16) -0.08(6.99)*** 0.03(5.83)*** 
ΔLnFDt-1 - - 0.28(4.33)*** 0.08(4.09)*** -0.02(3.72)*** 
ΔLnFDt-2 - - -0.11(2.28)** 0.01(0.83) - 
ΔLnFDt-3 - - 0.27(5.48)*** 0.08(4.00)*** - 
ΔLnTrade 0.06(1.65) 0.04(1.50) -0.02(0.62) -0.07(2.27)** -0.03(1.84)* 
ΔLnTradet-1 -0.06(2.26)** -0.03(1.21) -0.11(3.11)*** -0.08(2.47)** -0.01(0.74) 
ΔLnTradet-2 -0.20(4.81)*** -0.08(2.89)*** - - -0.08(4.48)*** 
ΔLnTradet-3 - - - - - 
ΔLnPI 0.01(1.16) 0.02(1.76)* 0.12(8.20)*** 0.02(2.71)** 0.05(7.04)*** 
ΔLnPIt-1 0.01(0.51) -0.04(1.98)* -0.16(6.49)*** - 0.01(1.17) 
ΔLnPIt-2 0.09(4.84)*** 0.07(3.41)*** 0.12(5.02)*** - 0.04(3.44)*** 
ΔLnPIt-3 - -0.05(4.05)*** -0.09(5.68)*** - 0.01(1.95)* 
ΔLnGov_Cons -0.15(5.18)*** -0.12(4.11)*** -0.13(4.61)*** -0.17(5.88)*** -0.22(10.03)*** 
ΔLnGov_Const-1 -0.05(2.56)** - -0.06(2.69)** -0.09(3.67)*** -0.15(8.02)*** 
ΔLnGov_Const-2 0.00(0.18) - - -0.05(2.35)** -0.10(5.66)*** 
ΔLnGov_Const-3 -0.04(1.58) - - 0.07(3.26)*** - 
Long-run      
LnY 0.04(3.00)** 0.01(0.32) 0.00(0.12) 0.00(0.13) 0.03(5.50)*** 
LnFD 0.08(4.36)*** 0.12(1.13) -0.18(1.02) -0.14(2.22)** 0.04(7.88)*** 
LnTrade 0.03(0.83) 0.13(0.72) 0.07(0.83) -0.12(1.19) -0.08(2.16)* 
LnPI 0.00(0.15) 0.00(0.31) 0.02(2.22)** 0.02(8.51)*** 0.01(4.21)*** 
LnGov_Cons -0.14(3.08)** -0.33(1.08) 0.05(0.41) 0.04(0.70) -0.09(3.93)*** 
Constant 3.39(25.85)*** 3.74(9.32)*** 3.96(6.56)*** 4.63(8.23)*** 3.91(34.13)*** 
Diagnostics      
F Statistic 4.67** 2.91* 4.68** 4.20** 18.03*** 
ECMt-1 -1.65(6.48)*** -0.45(4.91)*** -0.63(6.39)*** -0.78(6.11)*** -1.40(12.38)*** 
Adj. R2 0.76 0.69 0.72 0.85 0.89 
LM 4.14 0.13 0.01 0.17 0.21 
RESET 5.44 5.08 8.13 0.80 2.40 
Normality 1.01 2.42 0.71 0.15 0.59 
CUSUM s s s s s 
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Table 7: Greece 
Greece Private credit Bank asset Liquid liabilities Bank deposit Credit/deposit 
Short-run      
ΔLnGNt-1 0.48(2.96)** 0.34(1.81) 0.95(3.96)*** 0.93(6.89)*** 1.52(4.43)*** 
ΔLnGNt-2 -0.13(1.57) -0.39(2.76)** 0.35(2.28)** 0.94(8.61)*** 0.78(3.50)*** 
ΔLnGNt-3 - -0.22(1.16) 0.15(1.50) 1.10(13.23)*** 0.61(3.87)*** 
ΔLnY -0.01(2.51)** -0.02(2.42)** -0.01(1.57) -0.01(3.72)*** 0.03(6.15)*** 
ΔLnYt-1 0.13(9.44)*** 0.14(7.55)*** 0.10(7.23)*** 0.12(15.49)*** -0.03(4.18)*** 
ΔLnYt-2 0.08(7.65)*** 0.10(6.13)*** 0.08(6.49)*** 0.09(13.46)*** -0.03(5.40)*** 
ΔLnYt-3 0.03(5.26)*** 0.04(4.60)*** 0.04(5.26)*** 0.04(10.38)*** - 
ΔLnFD 0.12(1.53) -0.01(0.09) -0.57(4.68)*** -1.05(13.54)*** 0.86(8.03)*** 
ΔLnFDt-1 -0.28(2.92)** -0.36(2.29)* - 0.92(9.71)*** -0.07(0.92) 
ΔLnFDt-2 -0.46(5.25)*** -0.56(4.82)*** - 0.29(4.09)*** -0.31(4.38)*** 
ΔLnFDt-3 -0.51(4.54)*** -0.60(3.55)*** - -0.45(6.05)*** -0.38(5.24)*** 
ΔLnTrade -0.14(1.09) -0.24(1.40) -0.16(1.37) -1.12(11.82)*** 0.00(0.03) 
ΔLnTradet-1 -0.37(2.87)** -0.67(3.48)*** -0.36(3.33)*** 1.18(10.28)*** 1.58(6.27)*** 
ΔLnTradet-2 -0.80(6.05)*** -1.07(5.93)*** -0.30(2.46)** 0.04(0.39) 0.27(1.57) 
ΔLnTradet-3 -0.63(4.37)*** -0.96(2.99)** - 0.99(11.36)*** 0.48(3.11)** 
ΔLnPI 0.48(2.85)** 0.64(2.43)** 0.79(3.38)*** 1.38(8.84)*** -0.98(5.10)*** 
ΔLnPIt-1 0.83(4.78)*** 0.59(1.86) 0.71(3.26)*** 1.10(7.66)*** 1.91(6.83)*** 
ΔLnPIt-2 - 0.32(0.58) - -0.70(2.88)** -0.99(2.55)** 
ΔLnPIt-3 - -0.77(1.81) - 1.76(11.12)*** 2.20(6.55)*** 
ΔLnGov_Cons -0.66(5.58)*** -0.55(4.10)*** 0.11(1.03) 0.83(9.57)*** -0.36(3.23)** 
ΔLnGov_Const-1 1.49(9.22)*** 1.50(8.43)*** - 0.29(3.91)*** 0.12(1.06) 
ΔLnGov_Const-2 1.55(8.10)*** 1.84(6.60)*** - -0.07(0.90) 0.04(0.36) 
ΔLnGov_Const-3 0.90(5.50)*** 1.16(3.80)*** - -0.20(2.40)** -0.31(2.43)** 
Long-run      
LnY -0.06(3.51)** -0.06(2.18) -0.04(4.16)*** -0.06(2.77) 0.02(1.50) 
LnFD 0.19(2.51)* 0.22(1.39) -0.20(4.81)*** -0.02(0.12) 0.31(4.30)** 
LnTrade 0.04(0.41) 0.13(0.35) -0.17(2.87)** -0.68(3.76)* -0.56(2.38)* 
LnPI 0.05(6.59)*** 0.01(0.21) 0.05(7.13)*** 0.07(2.44) 0.08(5.40)** 
LnGov_Cons -0.93(4.35)*** -0.92(1.65) 0.11(1.25) 0.21(0.56) 0.12(0.44) 
Constant 5.69(22.82)*** 5.33(8.29)** 4.98(21.68)*** 5.95(14.77)*** 3.71(9.96)*** 
Diagnostics      
F Statistic 7.95** 2.53 7.38*** 10.34* 3.59 
ECMt-1 -2.73(9.77)*** -2.78(7.28)*** -2.81(8.02)*** -2.60(14.74)*** -3.16(7.57)*** 
Adj. R2 0.92 0.90 0.84 0.98 0.92 
LM 22.58 23.77 2.50 9.69 5.97 
RESET 5.58 6.99 6.71 0.84 1.83 
Normality 1.33 0.77 1.24 0.85 0.38 
CUSUM s s s s s 
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Table 8:  India 
India Private credit Bank asset Liquid liabilities Bank deposit Credit/deposit 
Short-run      
ΔLnGNt-1 1.08(4.13)*** 1.43(5.33)*** 0.62(4.08)*** 0.75(4.33)*** 0.16(1.64) 
ΔLnGNt-2 0.77(3.96)*** 0.71(4.19)*** 0.30(2.47)** 0.31(2.22)** 0.60(5.18)*** 
ΔLnGNt-3 0.42(3.39)*** 0.28(3.09)*** 0.17(2.27)** 0.25(2.81)** 0.09(1.36) 
ΔLnY -0.03(2.78)** -0.10(6.54)*** -0.02(2.93)** -0.03(2.85)** 0.02(2.25)** 
ΔLnYt-1 0.04(4.05)*** 0.08(6.49)*** 0.00(0.53) 0.08(5.90)*** -0.17(7.45)*** 
ΔLnYt-2 - - -0.02(2.77)** 0.03(2.64)** -0.13(8.14)*** 
ΔLnYt-3 - - - 0.03(2.75)** -0.06(4.31)*** 
ΔLnFD -0.28(0.83) 0.97(2.69)** 1.15(2.85)** 0.01(0.04) -2.17(6.90)*** 
ΔLnFDt-1 1.01(2.16)** 0.31(0.84) -0.44(1.18) 0.38(1.10) - 
ΔLnFDt-2 -0.56(1.31) -2.95(5.92)*** -1.10(3.10)*** -0.15(0.38) - 
ΔLnFDt-3 0.65(1.98)* -1.41(3.30)*** - 1.24(3.27)*** - 
ΔLnTrade 0.51(2.44)** -0.14(0.76) 0.37(2.24)** -0.04(0.21) 1.13(6.13)*** 
ΔLnTradet-1 0.09(0.32) 1.47(7.41)*** 1.26(7.02)*** 0.64(4.02)*** 0.26(1.24) 
ΔLnTradet-2 0.59(1.68) 0.35(1.44) 0.46(1.69) - -0.77(3.36)*** 
ΔLnTradet-3 -0.70(3.05)*** - - - -0.99(4.25)*** 
ΔLnPI 0.29(0.90) -0.52(1.89)* -0.79(3.80)*** -0.31(1.34) -0.49(2.45)** 
ΔLnPIt-1 - -0.51(1.71) - - 1.26(5.45)*** 
ΔLnPIt-2 - -1.08(3.53)*** - - 1.66(6.14)*** 
ΔLnPIt-3 - -1.37(4.53)*** - - 0.78(3.23)*** 
ΔLnGov_Cons -0.30(0.72) -1.24(2.64)** -0.32(0.97) -0.02(0.05) 1.05(4.79)*** 
ΔLnGov_Const-1 3.72(3.42)*** 5.70(4.53)*** 3.69(3.94)*** 2.71(4.34)*** -0.47(1.07) 
ΔLnGov_Const-2 1.61(3.14)*** 4.94(7.46)*** 2.71(6.38)*** 2.18(5.29)*** 0.63(1.52) 
ΔLnGov_Const-3 2.23(3.52)*** 2.05(3.42)*** 1.73(3.45)*** 1.14(2.96)** 2.07(4.27)*** 
Long-run      
LnY -0.03(1.41) -0.10(2.85)** -0.01(0.49) -0.05(1.36) 0.20(2.74)** 
LnFD 0.28(4.24)*** 1.08(3.69)*** 1.59(4.57)*** 0.45(2.22)* 0.02(0.04) 
LnTrade 0.25(2.80)** -0.41(1.81) -0.17(0.94) -0.12(0.71) 1.64(5.28)*** 
LnPI 0.13(2.17)* 0.31(3.19)** 0.02(0.17) 0.24(1.97)* -0.85(2.87)** 
LnGov_Cons -1.89(5.49)*** -3.89(4.87)*** -3.34(6.23)*** -2.48(4.88)*** 0.32(0.61) 
Constant 6.42(9.38)*** 10.19(6.70)*** 6.51(9.29)*** 8.00(8.05)*** 0.09(0.04) 
Diagnostics      
F Statistic 3.82** 4.46 5.35** 6.76*** 5.94** 
ECMt-1 -2.54(6.10)*** -2.57(7.01) -1.81(7.07)*** -1.89(8.12)*** -1.21(8.08)*** 
Adj. R2 0.84 0.88 0.90 0.88 0.94 
LM 13.59 1.03 11.63 10.25 15.18 
RESET 1.08 1.97 0.90 0.36 0.01 
Normality 0.32 5.83 0.72 1.33 21.58 
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Table 9: Japan 
Japan Private credit Bank asset Liquid liabilities Bank deposit Credit/deposit 
Short-run      
ΔLnGNt-1 0.19(2.70)** -0.11(1.08) -0.07(1.10) -0.08(1.41) -0.09(1.28) 
ΔLnGNt-2 -0.16(2.39)** -0.23(4.42)*** -0.24(4.72)*** -0.24(4.91)*** -0.39(6.01)*** 
ΔLnGNt-3 - - - - - 
ΔLnY 0.00(3.83)*** 0.00(3.61)*** 0.00(3.43)*** 0.00(3.27)*** 0.00(0.55) 
ΔLnYt-1 0.00(4.14)*** 0.00(1.55) 0.00(1.71) 0.00(1.77) 0.00(2.41)** 
ΔLnYt-2 0.00(2.93)** - - - 0.00(2.12)* 
ΔLnYt-3 - - - - - 
ΔLnFD 0.11(4.59)*** 0.05(4.11)*** 0.06(4.59)*** 0.05(4.51)*** -0.01(0.21) 
ΔLnFDt-1 -0.10(4.94)*** -0.08(5.99)*** -0.08(5.82)*** -0.08(6.07)*** -0.05(1.56) 
ΔLnFDt-2 -0.03(1.66) -0.12(7.84)*** -0.12(7.68)*** -0.12(8.42)*** 0.17(6.01)*** 
ΔLnFDt-3 - - - - - 
ΔLnTrade 0.05(5.29)*** 0.04(5.99)*** 0.03(5.74)*** 0.03(5.78)*** -0.01(1.80) 
ΔLnTradet-1 - 0.02(3.07)** 0.02(3.17)*** 0.02(3.61)*** 0.02(2.82)** 
ΔLnTradet-2 - - - - -0.02(3.99)*** 
ΔLnTradet-3 - - - - - 
ΔLnPI -0.30(5.06)*** -0.27(6.87)*** -0.24(6.47)*** -0.24(6.79)*** 0.06(2.21)* 
ΔLnPIt-1 0.04(0.94) -0.03(0.94) -0.03(0.79) -0.03(1.00) 0.01(0.39) 
ΔLnPIt-2 - 0.11(3.42)*** 0.11(3.24)*** 0.12(3.71)*** 0.12(3.98)*** 
ΔLnPIt-3 - - - - - 
ΔLnGov_Cons 0.01(0.26) 0.00(0.05) -0.01(0.28) 0.00(0.04) 0.07(2.58)** 
ΔLnGov_Const-1 -0.25(5.96)*** -0.15(5.86)*** -0.16(6.56)*** -0.16(6.87)*** -0.08(3.40)*** 
ΔLnGov_Const-2 -0.21(4.58)*** -0.17(5.05)*** -0.15(4.64)*** -0.15(4.94)*** - 
ΔLnGov_Const-3 - - - - - 
Long-run      
LnY 0.00(0.02) 0.00(1.24) 0.00(1.01) 0.00(1.05) 0.01(0.16) 
LnFD 0.18(4.69)*** 0.15(6.07)*** 0.16(5.49)*** 0.15(5.67)*** -1.98(0.18) 
LnTrade 0.07(4.11)*** 0.03(3.70)*** 0.03(3.09)** 0.03(3.09)** -0.33(0.18) 
LnPI -0.14(3.89)*** -0.12(5.57)*** -0.12(4.96)*** -0.12(5.17)*** -0.20(0.19) 
LnGov_Cons 0.24(3.35)*** 0.12(3.87)*** 0.11(3.40)** 0.11(3.54)** 0.54(0.25) 
Constant 2.50(10.69)*** 2.96(32.00)*** 2.94(28.00)*** 2.99(32.16)*** 12.75(0.24) 
Diagnostics      
F Statistic 4.67** 10.45*** 10.87*** 11.92*** 7.14** 
ECMt-1 -0.84(6.91)*** -1.04(10.98)*** -1.01(10.94)*** -1.00(11.45)*** -0.05(9.26)*** 
Adj. R2 0.84 0.91 0.92 0.92 0.89 
LM 17.10 7.29 9.54 8.52 20.00 
RESET 0.46 0.51 0.15 0.16 0.21 
Normality 0.42 0.29 0.40 0.24 0.28 
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Table 10: Bolivia 
Bolivia Private credit Bank asset Liquid liabilities Bank deposit Credit/deposit 
Short-run      
ΔLnGNt-1 0.43(4.67)*** 0.89(5.29)*** 0.62(6.04)*** 0.34(2.63)** 0.31(2.00)* 
ΔLnGNt-2  0.19(2.03)*  -0.17(2.02)* -0.16(1.57) 
ΔLnGNt-3      
ΔLnY 0.00(0.89) 0.01(2.50)** 0.01(1.55) 0.00(0.71) 0.00(0.58) 
ΔLnYt-1   0.01(3.28)*** 0.02(3.13)**  
ΔLnYt-2   0.01(3.24)*** 0.01(2.24)*  
ΔLnYt-3      
ΔLnFD 0.52(6.76)*** 0.37(4.16)*** 0.41(5.89)*** 0.44(4.26)*** 0.11(0.93) 
ΔLnFDt-1 -0.33(2.72)** -0.17(1.24) 0.00(0.01) -0.18(1.56) 0.23(2.11)* 
ΔLnFDt-2 0.64(8.12)*** 0.37(3.43)*** 0.32(4.53)*** 0.27(3.71)***  
ΔLnFDt-3      
ΔLnTrade 0.24(2.84)** 0.22(1.91)* 0.20(2.70)** 0.34(2.53)** 0.73(4.32)*** 
ΔLnTradet-1  0.48(3.00)** 0.25(2.67)** 0.38(2.54)** -0.19(1.39) 
ΔLnTradet-2  0.51(3.47)*** 0.56(5.81)*** 0.57(2.89)** 0.80(4.02)*** 
ΔLnTradet-3      
ΔLnPI 0.19(7.55)*** 0.24(7.77)*** 0.25(12.39)*** 0.30(9.17)*** 0.21(5.40)*** 
ΔLnPIt-1 0.00(0.10) -0.04(1.04) -0.02(0.89) -0.14(3.53)*** -0.24(4.62)*** 
ΔLnPIt-2 0.13(6.60)*** 0.20(6.05)*** 0.22(7.96)*** 0.26(6.50)*** 0.28(5.73)*** 
ΔLnPIt-3      
ΔLnGov_Cons -0.02(0.25) -0.09(1.11) -0.20(2.62)** 0.04(0.27) -0.33(2.27)** 
ΔLnGov_Const-1 -0.23(1.89)* 0.54(2.48)** 0.47(4.77)*** 0.30(1.57) 0.01(0.10) 
ΔLnGov_Const-2 0.70(6.22)*** 1.24(5.61)*** 1.09(6.84)*** 1.22(4.32)*** 1.51(5.20)*** 
ΔLnGov_Const-3      
Long-run      
LnY 0.00(0.55) 0.01(0.95) 0.00(0.47) -0.02(0.83) 0.00(0.62) 
LnFD 0.22(5.63)*** 0.25(5.59)*** 0.27(5.46)*** 0.25(2.12) -0.18(0.66) 
LnTrade 0.03(0.16) -0.27(1.07) -0.13(0.65) -0.11(0.23) 0.89(2.71)** 
LnPI -0.01(1.72) -0.01(2.32)* -0.01(1.39) -0.01(0.85) 0.02(4.51)*** 
LnGov_Cons -0.40(2.86)** -0.49(3.63)*** -0.35(3.15)** -0.31(0.95) 0.17(0.85) 
Constant 3.91(4.13)*** 5.20(4.61)*** 4.29(4.86)*** 4.30(1.82) 0.79(0.40) 
Diagnostics      
F Statistic 18.83*** 8.90*** 12.96*** 6.68** 5.53** 
ECMt-1 -1.85(13.25)*** -2.28(9.89)*** -2.17(12.47)*** -1.51(9.50)*** -1.28(7.54)*** 
Adj. R2 0.90 0.91 0.94 0.88 0.81 
LM 7.90 9.03 9.46 13.26 5.81 
RESET 5.05 7.27 6.21 6.24 2.44 
Normality 0.25 0.65 0.95 2.47 13.29 
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Table 11: the USA 
U.S. Private credit Bank asset Liquid liabilities Bank deposit Credit/deposit 
Short-run      
ΔLnGNt-1 - - - - - 
ΔLnGNt-2 - - - - - 
ΔLnGNt-3 - - - - - 
ΔLnY 0.00(1.62) 0.00(3.15)*** 0.00(1.43) 0.00(1.35) 0.00(0.53) 
ΔLnYt-1 0.00(4.05)*** 0.00(5.70)*** 0.00(5.37)*** 0.00(5.36)*** 0.00(3.14)*** 
ΔLnYt-2 0.00(1.77)* 0.00(3.20)*** 0.00(2.42)** 0.00(2.30)** - 
ΔLnYt-3 - - - - - 
ΔLnFD 0.08(2.59)** 0.06(2.04)* 0.07(3.47)*** 0.06(3.10)*** 0.05(1.58) 
ΔLnFDt-1 0.14(3.53)*** 0.06(2.04)* 0.08(4.05)*** 0.07(3.98)*** -0.05(1.88)* 
ΔLnFDt-2 - -0.10(3.64)*** -0.06(3.21)*** -0.07(3.44)*** - 
ΔLnFDt-3 - - - - - 
ΔLnTrade 0.05(2.96)*** 0.06(4.03)*** 0.05(4.04)*** 0.05(4.28)*** 0.04(2.20)** 
ΔLnTradet-1 - 0.04(2.85)** - - - 
ΔLnTradet-2 - - - - - 
ΔLnTradet-3 - - - - - 
ΔLnPI -0.14(2.37)** -0.21(4.40)*** -0.09(2.26)** -0.10(2.42)** -0.10(1.35) 
ΔLnPIt-1 0.07(0.70) 0.05(0.59) 0.12(2.98)*** 0.13(3.09)*** 0.12(1.22) 
ΔLnPIt-2 0.09(2.03)* 0.15(3.03)*** - - 0.07(1.29) 
ΔLnPIt-3 - - - - - 
ΔLnGov_Cons -0.03(1.17) -0.09(4.32)*** -0.07(5.07)*** -0.07(4.70)*** 0.01(0.46) 
ΔLnGov_Const-1 - 0.06(2.69)** - - -0.03(1.23) 
ΔLnGov_Const-2 - 0.08(3.21)*** - - -0.08(2.84)** 
ΔLnGov_Const-3 - - - - - 
Long-run      
LnY -0.01(2.31)** -0.01(3.38)*** -0.01(3.40)*** -0.01(3.38)*** -0.01(1.05) 
LnFD 0.01(0.40) 0.14(3.66)*** 0.09(1.65) 0.08(1.58) 0.12(0.52) 
LnTrade 0.08(3.07)*** -0.01(0.51) 0.01(0.31) 0.01(0.33) 0.00(0.03) 
LnPI 0.01(1.04) 0.06(5.56)*** 0.05(4.00)*** 0.05(4.04)*** 0.07(1.41) 
LnGov_Cons -0.04(1.03) -0.26(4.06)*** -0.15(2.48)** -0.14(2.37)** 0.14(0.97) 
Constant 3.43(21.39)*** 3.62(35.51)*** 3.52(27.86)*** 3.54(29.37)*** 2.52(2.48)** 
Diagnostics      
F Statistic 3.74** 5.77*** 6.92*** 7.05*** 3.05** 
ECMt-1 -0.57(5.57)*** -0.94(7.30)*** -0.56(7.48)*** -0.56(7.56)*** -0.35(5.09)*** 
Adj. R2 0.84 0.89 0.91 0.91 0.76 
LM 0.31 8.16 10.54 10.38 4.32 
RESET 1.20 3.10 0.44 0.27 0.30 
Normality 0.49 3.80 0.53 0.78 0.95 
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Table 12: Australia 
Australia Private credit Bank asset Liquid liabilities Bank deposit Credit/deposit 
Short-run      
ΔLnGNt-1 -0.15(1.88)* -0.05(0.69) 0.04(0.49) 0.01(0.19) -0.05(0.55) 
ΔLnGNt-2 -0.51(7.76)*** -0.47(7.82)*** -0.49(6.93)*** -0.50(7.17)*** -0.47(5.45)*** 
ΔLnGNt-3 -0.47(4.31)*** -0.44(4.65)*** -0.40(3.53)*** -0.40(3.62)*** -0.45(3.34)*** 
ΔLnY 0.00(1.82)* 0.00(0.66) 0.00(0.41) 0.00(0.54) 0.00(1.63) 
ΔLnYt-1 0.01(8.77)*** 0.01(10.31)*** 0.02(7.97)*** 0.02(8.21)*** 0.00(3.76)*** 
ΔLnYt-2 0.01(7.43)*** 0.01(8.62)*** 0.01(7.08)*** 0.01(7.29)*** 0.01(4.51)*** 
ΔLnYt-3 0.01(5.11)*** 0.00(5.28)*** 0.01(4.85)*** 0.01(4.98)*** 0.00(2.41)** 
ΔLnFD -0.16(4.69)*** -0.16(5.40)*** -0.24(5.16)*** -0.23(5.32)*** -0.20(4.28)*** 
ΔLnFDt-1 -0.09(1.77) -0.03(0.88) -0.12(2.08)* -0.11(2.04)* -0.03(0.67) 
ΔLnFDt-2 -0.06(1.12) -0.18(4.73)*** -0.26(3.86)*** -0.24(3.79)*** -0.06(1.30) 
ΔLnFDt-3 -0.06(1.69) - -0.15(2.70)** -0.15(2.82)** 0.08(2.00)* 
ΔLnTrade 0.00(0.05) 0.00(0.01) -0.06(1.49) -0.05(1.39) -0.06(1.52) 
ΔLnTradet-1 0.20(4.83)*** 0.17(5.04)*** 0.25(5.10)*** 0.25(5.21)*** 0.24(4.50)*** 
ΔLnTradet-2 0.12(3.91)*** 0.06(2.70)** 0.12(4.39)*** 0.13(4.61)*** 0.17(4.03)*** 
ΔLnTradet-3 0.06(1.80) 0.05(1.99)* 0.12(3.48)*** 0.12(3.54)*** 0.08(1.77) 
ΔLnPI 0.08(1.09) -0.01(0.23) 0.08(0.97) 0.06(0.77) 0.19(1.89)* 
ΔLnPIt-1 -0.53(3.93)*** -0.52(4.42)*** -0.69(4.57)*** -0.68(4.68)*** -0.65(3.68)*** 
ΔLnPIt-2 -0.50(3.93)*** -0.42(4.50)*** -0.43(3.83)*** -0.42(3.79)*** -0.55(4.18)*** 
ΔLnPIt-3 -0.45(3.84)*** -0.59(5.19)*** -0.60(4.40)*** -0.56(4.30)*** -0.55(3.33)*** 
ΔLnGov_Cons -0.07(1.64) 0.03(0.92) 0.06(1.14) 0.05(1.06) -0.05(1.14) 
ΔLnGov_Const-1 0.11(2.41)** -0.02(0.49) 0.03(0.57) 0.04(0.84) 0.14(3.13)** 
ΔLnGov_Const-2 0.23(5.07)*** 0.21(5.42)*** 0.17(3.40)*** 0.17(3.41)*** 0.26(4.67)*** 
ΔLnGov_Const-3 0.11(2.60)** - - - 0.19(3.17)*** 
Long-run      
LnY -0.01(1.16) -0.01(1.72) -0.01(1.32) -0.01(1.36) 0.00(0.11) 
LnFD -0.03(0.98) -0.01(0.62) 0.02(0.63) 0.01(0.40) -0.11(0.66) 
LnTrade -0.18(3.01)** -0.16(3.36)** -0.26(5.25)*** -0.25(5.13)*** -0.25(2.20)* 
LnPI 0.16(2.80)** 0.12(5.69)*** 0.14(5.41)*** 0.15(5.42)*** 0.19(1.55) 
LnGov_Cons -0.08(0.34) 0.06(0.56) -0.01(0.09) -0.03(0.20) -0.11(0.53) 
Constant 4.12(6.63)*** 3.75(12.08)*** 4.04(9.97)*** 4.09(10.19)*** 4.59(3.98)** 
Diagnostics      
F Statistic 8.81** 14.07*** 8.76*** 9.16*** 4.94** 
ECMt-1 -1.13(10.28)*** -1.13(12.03)*** -1.25(9.82)*** -1.22(10.04)*** -1.28(7.70)*** 
Adj. R2 0.92 0.93 0.90 0.91 0.87 
LM 15.45 18.33 8.54 9.14 6.06 
RESET 1.96 0.04 1.99 1.74 0.52 
Normality 0.03 0.71 0.55 0.52 1.25 
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Table 13: Belgium 
Belgium Private credit Bank asset Liquid liabilities Bank deposit Credit/deposit 
Short-run      
ΔLnGNt-1 -0.07(0.77) 0.45(2.44)** 0.45(2.38)** 0.47(2.51)** - 
ΔLnGNt-2 -0.64(8.37)*** - - - - 
ΔLnGNt-3 - - - - - 
ΔLnY -0.01(3.91)*** -0.01(2.51)** -0.01(2.57)** -0.01(2.71)** 0.01(2.46)** 
ΔLnYt-1 0.03(13.12)*** - - - -0.01(4.28)*** 
ΔLnYt-2 0.02(9.49)*** - - - -0.01(2.75)** 
ΔLnYt-3 0.01(5.42)*** - - - - 
ΔLnFD -0.50(12.32)*** -0.01(0.29) -0.02(0.34) 0.00(0.05) -0.06(1.49) 
ΔLnFDt-1 0.07(2.55)** - - - -0.02(0.44) 
ΔLnFDt-2 -0.13(4.27)*** - - - 0.14(3.34)*** 
ΔLnFDt-3 0.07(2.13)* - - - 0.07(1.65) 
ΔLnTrade 0.13(2.41)** -0.08(1.05) -0.09(1.13) -0.09(1.11) -0.23(2.74)** 
ΔLnTradet-1 1.04(10.29)*** 0.17(2.02)* 0.18(2.13)** 0.20(2.36)** - 
ΔLnTradet-2 0.15(2.09)* - - - - 
ΔLnTradet-3 - - - - - 
ΔLnPI -1.26(5.38)*** 0.08(0.45) 0.10(0.57) 0.14(0.79) -0.57(1.94)* 
ΔLnPIt-1 0.04(0.15) - - - -0.89(2.51)** 
ΔLnPIt-2 0.82(3.12)** - - - 1.59(4.66)*** 
ΔLnPIt-3 -2.12(10.50)*** - - - -1.85(6.85)*** 
ΔLnGov_Cons 0.92(8.26)*** -0.07(0.46) -0.06(0.39) -0.07(0.41) 0.19(1.34) 
ΔLnGov_Const-1 2.03(11.25)*** - - - -0.24(2.36)** 
ΔLnGov_Const-2 1.71(11.72)*** - - - 0.20(1.81)* 
ΔLnGov_Const-3 1.18(11.29)*** - - - 0.45(4.08)*** 
Long-run      
LnY -0.03(1.44) 0.00(0.21) 0.00(0.15) 0.00(0.11) 0.02(2.94)** 
LnFD -0.37(1.83) 0.00(0.05) -0.01(0.49) -0.01(0.82) -0.02(0.23) 
LnTrade -0.38(1.45) -0.02(0.30) -0.05(0.63) -0.06(0.81) 0.05(0.20) 
LnPI 0.71(1.89) 0.07(1.91)* 0.08(2.85)*** 0.09(3.15)*** -0.04(0.54) 
LnGov_Cons -0.58(1.53) 0.00(0.05) -0.01(0.18) -0.01(0.28) 0.26(2.34)** 
Contant 5.91(3.61)** 3.42(10.74)*** 3.56(10.36)*** 3.59(12.47)*** 2.68(3.17)** 
Diagnostics      
F Statistic 10.68** 5.46*** 5.26*** 5.35*** 6.36*** 
ECMt-1 -1.24(13.07)*** -1.65(6.39)*** -1.65(6.30)*** -1.69(6.35)*** -1.05(7.81)*** 
Adj. R2 0.96 0.64 0.64 0.65 0.82 
LM 7.32 0.67 0.35 0.38 3.46 
RESET 19.61 0.06 0.00 0.33 3.85 
Normality 1.16 6.70 10.03 10.18 1.02 
CUSUM s s s s s 
CUSUMSQ s s s s s 
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Table 14: Italy 
Italy Private credit Bank asset Liquid liabilities Bank deposit Credit/deposit 
Short-run      
ΔLnGNt-1 - - - 0.57(2.87)** - 
ΔLnGNt-2 - - - - - 
ΔLnGNt-3 - - - - - 
ΔLnY 0.01(2.23)** 0.01(4.25)*** 0.01(3.43)*** 0.01(2.56)** 0.01(3.61)*** 
ΔLnYt-1 - - - - - 
ΔLnYt-2 - - - - - 
ΔLnYt-3 - - - - - 
ΔLnFD -0.24(0.92) -0.06(0.51) -0.21(1.47) -0.26(1.62) -0.04(0.32) 
ΔLnFDt-1 -0.02(0.07) - - -0.11(0.47) -0.02(0.16) 
ΔLnFDt-2 -0.70(3.03)*** - - -1.28(4.38)*** 0.40(3.29)*** 
ΔLnFDt-3 - - - - - 
ΔLnTrade 0.08(0.92) 0.13(1.58) 0.13(1.47) 0.23(3.01)*** 0.22(2.49)** 
ΔLnTradet-1 -0.02(0.19) 0.35(3.73)*** 0.12(1.38) 0.30(3.03)*** 0.00(0.05) 
ΔLnTradet-2 -0.37(3.84)*** - -0.19(2.21)** -0.22(2.88)** -0.36(3.57)*** 
ΔLnTradet-3 - - - - - 
ΔLnPI -1.31(3.86)*** -1.14(7.51)*** -0.89(3.27)*** -1.81(6.46)*** -1.21(4.04)*** 
ΔLnPIt-1 -0.23(0.51) - -0.53(1.92)* -0.73(1.97)* -0.09(0.22) 
ΔLnPIt-2 -0.39(1.21) - - -1.12(3.52)*** -0.83(2.65)** 
ΔLnPIt-3 - - - - - 
ΔLnGov_Cons -0.26(1.38) -0.53(2.92)*** -0.17(0.97) -0.28(1.80)* -0.52(2.72)** 
ΔLnGov_Const-1 -0.67(3.31)*** - -0.32(1.97)* -0.86(4.14)*** -0.23(1.53) 
ΔLnGov_Const-2 -0.45(2.37)** - -0.45(2.45)** -0.24(1.70) -0.36(2.04)* 
ΔLnGov_Const-3 - - - - - 
Long-run      
LnY 0.00(0.03) 0.01(2.02)* 0.01(1.93)* 0.00(1.34) 0.01(1.72) 
LnFD 0.09(0.67) -0.08(1.44) -0.14(1.72) 0.17(1.58) -0.03(0.45) 
LnTrade 0.05(0.25) -0.21(2.82)** -0.01(0.09) 0.03(0.28) 0.13(0.77) 
LnPI -0.09(1.80) 0.01(0.53) -0.08(2.21)** -0.06(2.71)** -0.06(1.72) 
LnGov_Cons 0.61(1.22) -0.25(1.87)* 0.30(1.19) 0.22(1.54) 0.12(0.42) 
Constant 1.70(0.85) 5.36(8.46)*** 3.61(3.35)*** 2.39(3.15)** 3.18(2.35)** 
Diagnostics      
F Statistic 8.02*** 10.57*** 9.04*** 5.14** 8.93*** 
ECMt-1 -1.34(8.65)*** -1.49(8.82)*** -1.49(8.76)*** -2.45(7.08)*** -1.60(9.12)*** 
Adj. R2 0.80 0.74 0.80 0.89 0.82 
LM 6.69 0.22 6.94 16.16 7.75 
RESET 1.69 0.27 5.42 2.59 4.19 
Normality 0.84 5.00 0.92 0.09 1.32 
CUSUM s s s s s 
CUSUMSQ s s s s s 
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Table 15: Finland 
Finland Private credit Bank asset Liquid liabilities Bank deposit Credit/deposit 
Short-run      
ΔLnGNt-1 -3.25(13.83)*** -2.74(21.80)*** 1.27(4.16)*** 1.06(3.41)** -1.91(15.57)*** 
ΔLnGNt-2 -2.86(12.17)*** -2.34(18.25)*** 1.20(5.15)*** 1.03(4.32)*** -1.46(12.24)*** 
ΔLnGNt-3 -1.04(7.09)*** -0.75(8.99)*** 0.70(5.09)*** 0.62(4.55)*** -0.25(2.55)** 
ΔLnY 0.03(6.73)*** 0.04(10.73)*** 0.00(1.40) 0.00(1.50) 0.03(6.88)*** 
ΔLnYt-1 -0.20(9.54)*** -0.19(14.46)*** 0.06(9.19)*** 0.04(7.40)*** -0.06(8.03)*** 
ΔLnYt-2 -0.14(7.66)*** -0.13(11.51)*** 0.05(10.40)*** 0.04(8.49)*** -0.03(4.29)*** 
ΔLnYt-3 -0.05(5.22)*** -0.04(7.68)*** 0.03(9.02)*** 0.03(8.53)*** -0.01(2.16)* 
ΔLnFD -1.08(6.12)*** -0.62(3.98)*** 0.02(0.08) 0.18(0.63) -0.15(1.39) 
ΔLnFDt-1 -0.23(1.15) 0.24(2.23)* 0.50(2.47)** 0.34(1.57) -0.74(4.91)*** 
ΔLnFDt-2 0.52(4.15)*** 0.78(8.14)*** -1.20(5.42)*** -1.12(4.62)*** -0.91(8.32)*** 
ΔLnFDt-3 1.87(8.07)*** 2.24(11.55)*** -1.61(7.01)*** -1.79(6.12)*** 0.50(4.97)*** 
ΔLnTrade 1.58(9.52)*** 1.37(12.67)*** -0.63(3.58)*** -0.59(3.34)** 0.98(7.46)*** 
ΔLnTradet-1 -1.22(9.59)*** -1.57(15.12)*** -0.19(1.69) -0.21(1.55) -0.31(3.93)*** 
ΔLnTradet-2 -2.13(9.59)*** -2.41(14.02)*** -0.26(3.92)*** -0.15(2.12)* -0.27(3.01)** 
ΔLnTradet-3 -1.04(5.13)*** -1.07(8.10)*** 0.18(2.11)* 0.23(2.33)* - 
ΔLnPI -3.24(10.47)*** -2.57(12.93)*** -0.27(0.85) -0.51(1.66) -2.38(8.10)*** 
ΔLnPIt-1 -0.94(1.62) -0.27(0.76) 0.78(1.34) 0.81(1.43) 1.32(2.69)** 
ΔLnPIt-2 2.43(4.65)*** 3.31(8.48)*** -0.18(0.39) 0.14(0.28) -0.80(1.80) 
ΔLnPIt-3 -2.86(9.12)*** -2.64(13.17)*** -1.66(5.59)*** -1.26(4.47)*** -2.11(6.86)*** 
ΔLnGov_Cons 0.81(6.20)*** 0.53(6.09)*** 0.35(2.09)* 0.24(1.35) -0.10(0.87) 
ΔLnGov_Const-1 2.91(5.91)*** 0.59(3.28)** -2.93(10.76)*** -2.62(9.77)*** 2.23(7.18)*** 
ΔLnGov_Const-2 -0.22(1.47) -1.80(13.19)*** -1.13(5.25)*** -1.16(4.77)*** 0.84(4.87)*** 
ΔLnGov_Const-3 -0.98(3.29)** -1.99(7.14)*** 0.62(2.42)** 0.76(2.44)** 1.48(7.69)*** 
Long-run      
LnY -0.16(2.15) -0.24(2.21) -0.02(0.69) -0.01(0.36) -0.16(1.90) 
LnFD -0.95(1.32) -1.72(1.67) -0.17(0.45) -0.01(0.04) -1.11(1.43) 
LnTrade -2.05(1.59) -3.28(1.84) -0.27(1.35) -0.26(1.20) -1.21(1.57) 
LnPI 0.15(0.34) 0.90(1.15) -0.18(1.05) -0.16(0.81) -0.74(1.17) 
LnGov_Cons 2.72(3.22)* 1.59(1.83) 1.12(1.11) 0.91(0.83) 5.54(2.08) 
Constant 7.99(1.31) 17.17(1.69) 2.76(1.57) 2.58(1.21) 1.23(0.15) 
Diagnostics      
F Statistic 5.10 11.65* 2.82 2.34 6.51* 
ECMt-1 1.64(10.35)*** 1.10(15.64)*** -2.84(7.69)*** -2.62(7.01)*** 0.69(10.20)*** 
Adj. R2 0.96 0.98 0.94 0.93 0.96 
LM 12.80 15.15 25.38 23.60 17.81 
RESET 1.80 1.35 7.57 6.27 0.01 
Normality 0.65 0.56 0.10 0.21 2.64 
CUSUM s s s s s 
CUSUMSQ s s s s s 
47 
 
 
Table 16: Singapore 
Singapore Private credit Bank asset Liquid liabilities Bank deposit Credit/deposit 
Short-run      
ΔLnGNt-1 0.31(1.76) -0.41(3.64)*** -0.45(2.10)* -0.65(3.95)*** -1.48(7.68)*** 
ΔLnGNt-2 1.18(3.62)*** 0.97(6.83)*** - - -0.81(3.82)*** 
ΔLnGNt-3 - - - - -0.47(3.66)*** 
ΔLnY 0.00(0.44) 0.00(0.09) 0.00(2.03)* 0.00(1.47) -0.01(5.50)*** 
ΔLnYt-1 0.03(5.44)*** 0.03(11.56)*** 0.03(5.78)*** 0.03(7.78)*** 0.03(10.18)*** 
ΔLnYt-2 0.02(5.38)*** 0.02(11.57)*** 0.02(5.92)*** 0.02(7.82)*** 0.02(10.08)*** 
ΔLnYt-3 0.01(3.58)*** 0.01(8.51)*** 0.01(5.05)*** 0.01(6.27)*** 0.01(8.94)*** 
ΔLnFD 0.09(2.17)* 0.03(1.05) 0.07(1.39) 0.00(0.00) -0.08(3.82)*** 
ΔLnFDt-1 0.86(4.78)*** 0.76(10.16)*** 0.15(2.45)** 0.31(5.70)*** -0.06(2.87)** 
ΔLnFDt-2 0.48(4.62)*** 0.33(8.96)*** - 0.03(1.03) -0.14(5.48)*** 
ΔLnFDt-3 0.35(3.10)** 0.47(7.24)*** - 0.24(4.71)*** -0.02(1.35) 
ΔLnTrade -0.30(3.74)*** -0.41(8.30)*** -0.20(3.53)*** -0.28(5.78)*** -0.17(7.17)*** 
ΔLnTradet-1 0.32(3.89)*** 0.38(8.66)*** 0.08(2.06)* 0.23(5.15)*** -0.03(1.74) 
ΔLnTradet-2 0.28(4.72)*** 0.38(10.47)*** 0.18(4.43)*** 0.24(7.24)*** 0.08(4.09)*** 
ΔLnTradet-3 0.23(4.68)*** 0.33(10.04)*** 0.15(4.45)*** 0.21(6.39)*** 0.11(6.43)*** 
ΔLnPI 0.41(2.64)** 0.54(6.17)*** 0.05(0.57) 0.23(2.88)** -0.08(1.06) 
ΔLnPIt-1 -0.57(3.36)*** -0.30(4.89)*** 0.23(2.86)** 0.10(1.56) 0.12(1.54) 
ΔLnPIt-2 -0.48(4.12)*** -0.44(8.64)*** -0.28(3.42)*** -0.31(4.81)*** -0.39(4.77)*** 
ΔLnPIt-3 0.11(1.68) 0.17(5.58)*** 0.26(3.97)*** 0.23(4.97)*** 0.15(3.90)*** 
ΔLnGov_Cons 0.10(3.25)*** 0.04(2.41)** 0.03(1.15) 0.01(0.53) -0.01(0.51) 
ΔLnGov_Const-1 -0.71(5.03)*** -0.48(10.07)*** -0.05(1.73) - 0.11(5.26)*** 
ΔLnGov_Const-2 -0.55(5.21)*** -0.39(10.38)*** -0.05(2.29)** - 0.05(1.74) 
ΔLnGov_Const-3 -0.21(3.35)*** -0.17(6.55)*** 0.03(1.20) - 0.06(2.65)** 
Long-run      
LnY -0.13(0.51) 0.22(0.70) 0.14(1.41) 0.22(0.63) 0.04(2.85)** 
LnFD -2.46(0.56) 2.74(0.72) -0.21(0.55) 0.68(0.80) -0.03(1.19) 
LnTrade -1.77(0.60) 3.49(0.69) 0.96(1.26) 2.81(0.67) 0.22(2.37)* 
LnPI 3.51(0.54) -4.64(0.74) -0.74(1.52) -2.16(0.75) -0.34(5.88)*** 
LnGov_Cons 3.21(0.60) -3.30(0.68) -0.08(0.37) -0.11(0.27) 0.17(2.72)* 
Constant 3.19(0.72) -2.71(0.27) 1.31(0.48) -7.71(0.45) 3.27(8.40)*** 
Diagnostics      
F Statistic 2.40 10.52*** 3.32* 6.25*** 7.34** 
ECMt-1 -0.28(5.37)*** 0.17(11.24)*** 0.30(5.69)*** 0.16(7.63)*** 1.09(9.95)*** 
Adj. R2 0.75 0.94 0.78 0.87 0.93 
LM 0.04 12.31 1.60 10.25 16.92 
RESET 2.90 2.65 0.49 0.14 0.02 
Normality 0.77 0.74 0.31 0.06 0.40 
CUSUM s s s s s 
CUSUMSQ s s s s NS 
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APPENDIX A: VARIABLES AND DATA SOURCE 
Variable Definition Data Source 
GN Gini-Index=Gini-Coefficient*100 Estimated Household Income Inequality Data 
Set (EHII)-UTIP 
Liquid Liability Liquid Liabilities/GDP  
 
 
 
A Database on Financial Development and 
Structure (updated September 2012) 
Bank Asset Deposit Money Bank Assets/GDP 
Private Credit Private Credit(by deposit money banks and 
other financial institutions)/GDP 
 Bank Deposit Financial System Deposits/GDP 
Credit/Deposit Bank Credit/Bank Deposits 
Y Real GDP per capita  
 
 
 
World Bank Open Data 
 
Trade (Export+Import)/GDP 
Gov_cons Goverment Consumption/GDP 
PI Consumer Price Index 
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CHAPTER 2:  FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND INCOME DISTRIBUTION 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Over the past few decades, the global economy has seen a phenomenal growth 
rate in emerging markets and high prosperity in developed countries; however, the 
persistence of poverty as well as increasing income disparities still pose challenges for 
policymakers in developing and developed countries. Some economists have turned from 
investigating determinants of economic growth to examining the factors that shape 
income distribution. One emerging line of inquiry attempts to assess the impact of 
financial development on inequality and poverty, beyond its effect on economic growth.  
 
The positive role played by finance in economic growth has been well 
established; however, the literature on the relationship between financial development 
and income distribution is still nascent. The development of the financial sector tends to 
directly affect the income of the poor through human capital and physical capital 
accumulation, whether or not the poor have previously been using financial services 
(Demirguc-Kunt and Levine 2009). By financing education and/or investment projects, 
the poor can attain to higher levels of wage income and/or capital income. Furthermore, if 
financial development disproportionately enhances the income of the poor more than it 
does for the rich, income inequality can be narrowed.  
 
Theoretical works on income distribution and financial development support an 
inextricable link between the two, though not offering a clear-cut conclusion. One strand 
of theories proposes an inverted-U relationship between finance and income distribution, 
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while the others predict a linear relationship. The nonlinear link is initially postulated by 
Kuznets (1955) on the relation of growth and income inequality. Greenwood and 
Jovanovic (1990) theoretically modeled this link with endogenous financial 
intermediation. The fixed cost for joining financial coalition widens income inequality at 
the early stage of development, because only the rich can afford to join. However, as 
larger financial intermediaries foster more rapid economic growth, finance eventually 
becomes affordable to the poor, thus encouraging more equal income distribution.  
 
With credit constraint as a key factor, several theoreticians have modeled a linear 
relationship between financial development and income distribution. Galor and Zeira 
(1993) and Galor and Moav (2004) suggest that easing credit constraints can benefit low-
income groups through the channel of human capital accumulation, gradually reducing 
income inequality and promoting growth. Similarly, Banerjee and Newman (1993) show 
that income distribution and economic growth are negatively correlated with an imperfect 
credit market, which excludes the poor from investing and becoming entrepreneurs. 
 
Building on these theoretical predictions, there is a growing interest in empirically 
discovering the link between financial development and income inequality. Cross-country 
evidence from Beck et al. (2004) and Beck et al. (2007) supports that expanding private 
credit can stimulate income growth for the poorest quintiles and reduce the growth rate of 
income inequality. Similarly, constructing a panel of 83 countries from the year 1960 to 
1995, Clark et al. (2006) establish a favorable impact of financial deepening on the 
degree of income inequality. Kim and Lin (2011) support the inverted-U hypothesis by 
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stating that the size of the banking sector and stock market only reduces inequality and 
poverty if it exceeds a certain threshold. Other than effects from financial deepening, 
Jeanneney and Kpodar (a2011) show that financial instability tends to aggravate poverty. 
Kunieda et al. (2011) demonstrate that financial integration tends to aggravate income 
inequality by benefiting the privileged group.  
 
Generally speaking, the literature supports a favorable impact of financial 
development on poverty and inequality. However, inconsistency exists between 
theoretical and empirical works. The former demonstrate the role of access to credit in 
shaping income distribution, while the latter mainly focuses on the effect of financial 
deepening. Claessens and Perotti (2007) and Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2008) both accentuate 
the role of access to finance in reducing poverty and inequality. Honohan (2004) also 
points out that it is insufficient by representing financial development with financial 
deepening alone. 
 
Concerning this literature insufficiency, this paper examines the finance-
inequality-poverty linkage by using multidimensional indicators of the financial 
development, not only including financial depth, but also financial access, efficiency, 
stability, and financial liberalization. The development of different aspects of the 
financial sector tends to affect the income of the poor through the same channels of 
human capital and physical capital accumulations, but by different mechanism. 
 
52 
 
 
The power of financial access in reducing poverty is mainly attributable to its 
impact on individuals and small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) that have 
previously been excluded from financial services, because it offers the access to 
investment opportunities. Nevertheless, financial deepening also benefits the previous 
low-income users of financial services by enhancing their credit lines, thus providing 
better investment options. An efficient financial system allows individuals to find the 
most affordable financial services at the lowest cost of time and money. The lower cost, 
especially, can be very beneficial to the poor. A stable financial system demonstrates the 
quality of financial development and sustains the confidence of the poor. Both the 
improved efficiency and stability encourage the poor to accumulate capital and make 
investments. The relationship between financial liberalization and poverty reduction, 
however, is ambiguous: it depends on the willingness of foreign investors to provide 
credit to pro-poor projects and low-income groups. In the presence of information 
asymmetry, seeking to maximize profits and minimizing risks, the foreign capital is very 
likely to prefer projects and individuals in the privileged group.  
 
This paper is aimed at investigating the nexus of finance, inequality, and poverty 
in the multi-dimensional development of the financial system. It contributes to the 
literature comprehensive conclusions as to how financial development shapes the 
distribution of income. Applying an instrumental variable regression on a large sample, 
we have three important findings. First, the development of financial access, depth, 
stability, and efficiency all contribute to reducing income inequality and poverty. The 
results are quite robust in different samples and measurements. Second, as is consistent 
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with Kunieda et al. (2011), the coefficients on liberalization indicators suggest that 
liberalization the financial sector to foreign investors tends to exacerbate domestic 
income distribution and the poverty gap. Third, evidence supports a stronger favorable 
effect from developing financial institutions than from developing financial markets. Two 
stock market variables—one indicating market access, the other indicating stability—turn 
out to be insignificant in reducing inequality and poverty.  
 
In what follows, section 2.2 describes the data and methodology; section 2.3 
presents the empirical results; section 2.4 shows additional evidence from using 
disaggregated distribution data: and section 2.5 provides conclusions and policy 
messages. 
 
2.2 Data and Methodology 
2.2.1. The Data 
Both income inequality and poverty indicators are used separately as dependent 
variables. The proxy for income inequality is measured by the commonly used gini-
coefficient, which is a relative ratio of the areas on the Lorenz curve diagram. It is scaled 
from 0 to the 100th percentile in our dataset. 0 percent represents a perfectly equal 
outcome, in which each individual receives the same level of income; 100 percent 
represents extremely unequal distribution, where one person takes all the income in the 
economy. Though the gini-coefficient, to some degree, reflects the distribution of 
income, it is unable to show the welfare of the low-income group. The poverty level may 
be reduced with or without the gini-coefficient decreasing. To understand the role of 
financial development in combating poverty, the poverty gap index is also used to carry 
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out the main regressions. The poverty gap measures the average income shortfall of the 
poor individual from the poverty line ($1.25 a day).  
 
To cover five dimensions of financial sector development—financial access, 
depth, efficiency, stability, and liberalization—10 variables from the Global Financial 
Development Database (GFDD) are used. Each dimension is measured by two variables, 
one indicating financial institution development, the other the financial market.
8
  
 
To capture access to financial services, we choose bank accounts per 1,000 adults 
and value traded of the top 10 trading companies to total value traded. The former reflects 
access to credit in banks, and the latter indicates the lack of access to financial markets.  
 
Financial depth is measured by the ratio of bank private credit to GDP and the 
stock market’s total value traded to GDP, which are the most widely adopted indicators 
for financial deepening in the literature. Larger values suggest deeper financial 
institutions and stock markets.  
 
To measure financial efficiency, we select the net interest margin and the stock 
market turnover ratio. A higher net interest margin suggests that banks are not operating 
efficiently, while higher turnover ratio (stock traded/capitalization) means an efficient 
stock market.  
 
                                                          
8
 One exception is the financial liberalization variables: one indicates domestic liberalization; the other 
proxies external liberalization. 
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The stability of financial institutions and markets is measured by the ratio of 
regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets and the volatility of the stock price index, 
respectively. Larger shares of regulatory capital imply that banks have a lower 
probability of default, whereas a higher volatility of stock price indicates the financial 
market is becoming less stable. 
 
Financial liberalization is measured through two dimensions: domestic 
liberalization and international liberalization. Based on the financial reform database 
from Abiad, Detragiache, and Tressel (2008), we aggregate the index of credit control, 
interest rate control, entry barriers, banking supervision, privatization, and securities 
market to the domestic financial reform. To measure external liberalization, we use the 
ratio of consolidated foreign claims of BIS-reporting banks to GDP, with larger values 
suggesting more liberalized financial institutions. 
 
Other than the key variables, we use real GDP per capita, government expenditure 
to GDP, total traded to GDP, and the inflation rate, i.e., standard macroeconomic control 
variables. Real GDP per capita is used to control for the economic growth effect, as the 
literature suggests an inextricable link between inequality, poverty, and economic 
development. The coefficient of GDP per capita is expected to be negative, because 
lower inequality and poverty are associated with a higher income level. Similarly, 
negative signs are expected to be found on the coefficients of government expenditure to 
GDP (scaled from 1 to 100) and total trade to GDP (scaled from 1 to 100), which are 
adopted to capture the beneficial effects of public spending and trading. According to 
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Easterly and Fischer (2001), the coefficient on the inflation rate (scaled from 1 to 100) is 
expected to be positive, because inflation hurts the poor more than it hurts the rich. 
 
2.2.2. Methodology 
The following equations are the basic regression specification: 
, 1 , 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , ,i t i t i t i t i t i t i tGini FD Y Infl Trade Gov                                     (1) 
, 1 , 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , ,i t i t i t i t i t i t i tPovgap FD Y Infl Trade Gov                                (2) 
 
A basic OLS regression is first employed. The dependent variables are 
,i tGini  
and
,i tPovgap , representing the gini coefficient and the poverty gap respectively. ,i tFD  
refers to each of the 10 indicators of financial development: thus a significant and 
negative 1  reflects a reduction in inequality and poverty.
9
  Accordingly, 
,i tY  is the log of 
GDP per capita used to control for the growth effect, and we expect 1  to be negative. 
Infl , Trade , and Gov  are a set of control variables denoting inflation rate, trade 
openness, and government expenditure. Following the literature, 2 is expected to be 
positive; 3  and 4 are expected to be negative.  
 
Considering the potential endogeneity problem, we employ the instrumental 
variable (IV) regressions. 
,i tFD  and ,i tY  are considered to be endogenous, because the 
link between income inequality/poverty and financial development might be an instance 
                                                          
9
 Value trades of the top 10 trading companies, overhead costs to total assets, and volatility of stock price 
index are three indicators with lower values suggesting a more developed and stable financial sector. Thus, 
a positive 1  implies that financial development reduces poverty and inequality.  
57 
 
 
of reverse causation. For example, other than finance affecting poverty, a reduced 
poverty level implies that financial services are already more affordable and accessible to 
the poor, and thus stimulating the development of the financial sector. Similarly, a lower 
poverty gap/income inequality might also promote economic growth according to the 
inverted-U pattern for the impact of income distribution on economic growth. Therefore 
controlling for the possible reverse causation and simultaneity bias is essential to 
revealing the impact of finance on inequality and poverty. 
 
To instrument the financial development and GDP per capita, we use two types of 
instruments. The first is the lagged value of the endogenous variables. As realized in an 
earlier period, the lagged values are less likely to be correlated with the current error term 
but very likely to be correlated with their own future values. We use at least the second 
lags to avoid autocorrelation with the current error term. According to the growth and 
finance literature, the second type of instrument is measures of ethnic, linguistic, and 
religious factionalism.  
 
To prove the validity of the instruments, we consider both underidentification and 
overidentification tests.10 The Sargan-Hansen test is a test of overidentifying restrictions. 
Under the null hypothesis the instruments are uncorrelated with the error term, and the 
excluded instruments are correctly excluded from the estimated equation. A rejection of 
the null implies invalidity of the instruments. The underidentification test is an LM test of 
whether the excluded instruments are correlated with the endogenous independent 
variables.  A rejection of the null indicates that the model is identified. 
                                                          
10
 Underidentification test results are not reported, but are available upon request. 
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2.3. Empirical Results 
2.3.1. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
The annual data sample consists of 144 countries from the year 1961 to 2011; 
however, the time periods covered in each regression vary with the availability of data. 
Table 17 and Table 18 report the descriptive statistics and correlation coefficients. Most 
of the variables are negatively correlated with the gini-coefficient and the poverty gap, 
reflecting possible beneficial effects of finance on income distribution;
11
 however, 
inflation, domestic financial liberalization and external financial liberalization seem to 
suggest an aggravating effect on income inequality and poverty.  
 
The main results regarding effects of financial development on income inequality 
and poverty are listed from Table 19 to Table 23, with each financial variable tested with 
both OLS and IV approaches. The first four columns of each table consider the gini-
coefficient as the dependent variable-focusing on the financial impact on income 
inequality; whereas the last four columns shift to the effect on the poverty alleviation. 
The rest of this section provides explanations of coefficients on financial variables and 
coefficients on control variables, as well as test results separately.  
 
2.3.2. Financial Development, Income Inequality and Poverty gap 
Table 19 reports the effects of financial access. Both OLS and IV results suggest 
that improving banking access can reduce the gini-coefficient at one percent significant 
                                                          
11
 The value traded in top 10 trading companies, net interest margin and stock price volatility show positive 
correlation signs, however, suggesting the same beneficial effect from financial access, efficiency and 
stability. 
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level. Similar beneficial impacts can be seen on poverty alleviation. Column 5 and 6 both 
show that increasing 1 bank account per 1000 adults can reduce the poverty gap by 0.007 
percentage point. Though the signs are as expected, none of the coefficients on financial 
market access, measured by value traded in top 10 trading companies, is significant. 
Unlike the result regarding to banking access, it implies the inability of market access 
expansion in terms of affecting income inequality and poverty.  
 
Table 20 presents the results associated with financial deepening.  Regarding to 
the impact on improving income inequality, coefficients on both the size of private credit 
and stock market are significant and negative (column 1 to 4). The evidence also shows 
that the reducing-inequality impact from the private credit deepening is almost two times 
stronger (-0.041 v.s. -0.022) than from the stock market expansion. Turning to the 
relationships with poverty gap, the IV regressions results support the same favorable 
effects of financial deepening. Increasing 1 percentage point of private credit to GDP can 
reduce poverty gap by 0.019 percentage point at 10% significant level. Though slightly 
smaller, a significant coefficient equals -0.015 is observed regarding to the stock market 
total value traded. These findings are consistent with Clark et al. (2006), Beck et al. 
(2004), and Beck et al. (2007). They support the inequality-reducing effect of financial 
deepening in both banks and stock markets.  
 
Evidence in Table 21 shows that both the two efficiency indicators we choose can 
potentially reduce the income inequality and poverty. The coefficients on the net interest 
margin suggest a positive relationship with inequality and poverty, however, not 
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significant when using poverty gap as the dependent variable. Decreasing net interest 
margin by 1%, which means improving the efficiency of financial institutions, can reduce 
the income inequality by 0.44 percentage point based on the IV regression result. The 
coefficients on stock market turnover ratio are all significant and negative, reflecting a 
similar improving-inequality and poverty effect.  
 
Table 22 shows the impacts of financial stability on income inequality. The 
evidence only supports the beneficial effect from improving the stability of financial 
institutions, measured by the ratio of regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets, not the 
stability of the stock market. The coefficients on the regulatory capital to risk-weighted 
assets are all negative and highly significant at 1% level, which means reducing 
regulatory capital can adding income inequality and poverty to an economy. Although IV 
regressions yield positive coefficients on the stock market volatility index, none of them 
is significant. On the global average level, a 1 percent improvement in the ratio of 
regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets can lower the gini coefficient and the poverty 
gap significantly by 0.375 and 0.342 percentage point respectively.  
 
Contrary to the effects of financial depth, access, efficiency, and stability, Table 
23 shows an aggravating-distribution effects deriving from financial liberalization. 
Unlike the other financial characteristics which employ two indicators to capture banks 
and stock markets, the two variables in this table measures the domestic financial 
liberalization and external financial liberalization. Considering the effects on reducing 
income inequality, coefficients on both the two variables are positive and significant at 
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1% level. It implies that the liberalization of the financial section tends to worsen the 
income inequality. Turning to the impacts on poverty reduction, there is no significant 
relationship between domestic financial liberalization. But coefficients on the external 
financial liberalization show that it can significantly reduce the poverty gap. 
 
To summarize, the development of financial institutions has a stronger impact on 
the improvement of poverty and inequality than the development of financial markets. By 
investigating the role of bank-based and market-based financial sector in reducing 
poverty, Kpodar and Singh (2011) draw a similar conclusion. Financial institution 
development indicators, on financial access, depth, efficiency, and stability are all seen as 
able to help relieving the poverty and inequality problem. However, turning to stock 
market development indicators, only the size and liquidity of the stock market show such 
favorable impacts. Moreover, improving access to the stock market can even harm 
income distribution (as seen in Table 19).  
 
The signs of significant coefficients on the control variables are mostly as 
expected. The GDP per capita, government consumption and trade openness are 
negatively correlated with inequality and poverty, which suggests the beneficial 
impacts
12
. Inflation is positively correlated, reflecting a worsening distribution effect. 
Examining the Hansen’s J statistics, we find all of the IV regressions pass the 
overidentification test, which supports the validity of the instruments.  
 
                                                          
12
 One exception is significant coefficients on GDP per capital associated with banking access in table 19 is 
positive, which may attribute to the lacking of data on financial access indicators. Another exception is that 
some significant coefficients on government consumption are positive in table 20 and table 23. 
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Table 24 provides the beta coefficients of each financial variable, which gives the 
economic significance of each characteristic of financial development. In terms of 
inequality-reducing effects, the indicator of financial access--bank accounts per 1,000 
adults--is the major contributor with a beta coefficient equals -0.486. The implication 
coincides with the recent popular discussions on the importance of financial access. Both 
Honohan (2004) and Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2008) emphasize that, what matters the most 
in improving poverty and inequality should be the expansion of access to finance.  
 
However, evidence in the poverty section does not support the same variable as 
the major contributor. Instead, the stability of the banking sector—regulator capital to 
risk-weighted assets—seems to be the most important (beta coefficient = -0.385) 
characteristic that drives down the poverty gap. Other than the bank-stability indicator, 
access to finance still matters the most in reducing poverty at global level. Due to the data 
insufficiency in the financial access (maximum is ten years available data) as well as in 
the poverty gap variables, we suggest interpreting the results carefully. There is a 
possibility that, with sufficient access data, instead of banking stability, banking access is 
the strongest candidate of poverty alleviation. 
 
We also notice that, though not all are significant in the main results, financial 
liberalizations can be counterproductive factors in improving income distribution. 
However, given the sizes of these beta coefficients, none of them is large enough to offset 
all the beneficial impact. Therefore we conclude that financial development, in general, 
can significantly reduce income inequality and poverty. 
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To check the robustness of the effects, we employ IV regressions on a new 
sample which is calculated by taking the five-year average of the original dataset. The 
financial effects suggested by the annual results are mostly. Except the significant effects 
from banking stability and domestic liberalization, Table 25 confirmed all the financial 
impacts on reducing income inequality with the new sample. Table 26 provides the IV 
regression results when using the poverty gap as the dependent variable. With the new 
sample we confirmed all the significances in the annual sample regarding to the poverty 
reduction. Furthermore, the five-year average dataset finds that the banking efficiency, 
captured by net interest margin, can also serve as an important variable in poverty 
alleviation.  
 
2.4. Additional Evidence-Effects on Quintile Income Share 
2.4.1. Motivation 
By using the gini-coefficient as the inequality indicator, the empirical analysis so 
far mainly tackles the impact of finance on income inequality. Though it is able to tell 
whether finance improves or worsens the overall income distribution, it is inadequate to 
provide the detail about how finance affects the income share of different groups in an 
economy. For instance, with the results associated with gini-coefficient (or even with 
poverty-gap), one cannot perceive the effects of finance on the middle and rich income 
segment. For more in-depth investigation, this subsection provides evidence on the 
impact of finance on five different income quintile groups. Holding the similar idea, 
Canavire-Bacarreza and Rioja (2009) test the distributional effect of financial deepening 
in the Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) region. They find that financial deepening 
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can enhance the income shareshare of income by most of the middle quintiles, but not the 
poor and rich quintile in the LAC region. With a more recent quintile dataset and multiple 
aspects of finance examined, findings in this section are somewhat different from and 
richer than Canavire-Bacarreza and Rioja (2009). Most of the results support the previous 
findings that financial development improves the income share of the five groups 
differently towards a more equalized income distribution, whereas the financial 
liberalization disproportionately benefits the rich. 
 
The five income quintile variables, Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 and Q5, represent the income 
share held by each 20% individuals in an economy
13
. They are derived from adding data 
in each two consecutive decile groups. Following an ascending pattern, from Q1 to Q5, 
they represent lowest, lower-middle, middle, higher-middle and highest income quintile 
group. The summary statistics in table 27 show strong contrast income shares across 
different groups. The average share of income in Q5- the richest 20% people is 48.86 
percent, almost half of the national income. Meanwhile, the average income possesses by 
Q1-the lowest 20% is only 5.78 percent.  
 
The methodology used is the instrumental variable regression. The dependent 
variable switched to shares of income in different quintiles. The set of instruments used 
in regressions related to the same financial variable are kept identical. Prior to the formal 
analysis, the nature of the data is worth noting. Rather than a level of income, the data is 
a ratio of the total income in a specific group to the aggregate income in an economy. 
Thus observing a reduction does not necessarily infer a decrease in the levels of income. 
                                                          
13
 The original decile dataset is obtained from the World Bank PovcalNet. 
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Given the effect of finance on national income, the income level of this group may still 
increase, but to a smaller degree than the denominator. On the other hand, an increase in 
income share is more likely caused by a greater degree of rise in the level of income 
instead. Highlighting this point is to reaffirm that the goal of shared prosperity and 
inclusive growth is less likely to be violated due to changes in such shares. 
 
Suppose that a financial characteristic is improving inequality, generally speaking, 
we should observe at least one positive effect in the lower income quintiles(Qi) and one 
negative effect in some relatively higher quintiles(Qj, i<j). It reflects that Qi 
disproportionately benefits from a financial event and crowds out the share of 
incomeincome share in Qj(i<j). Given the complexity in deriving an overall effect on 
inequality, however, results in quintiles need to be interpreted with caution. For example, 
observing four positive coefficients in Q1, Q2, Q3 and Q4, along with a negative one in 
Q5, might suggests more inequality if an obvious ascending trend shows in coefficients 
from Q1 to Q4.  
 
2.4.2. Effects of Finance on Income sharethe Quintile Income Share 
Ten more results tables relating each financial characteristic are listed, with the 
first column presents the impact of finance on income inequality and the following five 
columns provide results regarding to each income quintile
14
. In almost all the additional 
results, the financial coefficients through column 2 to 6 are consistent with findings in 
column 1.  
                                                          
14
 Results regarding to gini-coefficient (first column) are exactly the same with previous section. The 
purpose of re-display is for easy analogous, which means that we want to check if the income quintile 
results coherent with inequality ones. 
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In table 28, the financial coefficients from Q1 to Q4 are all highly significant and 
positive, implying that more bank accounts opening tends to increase the income share by 
all the four income quintiles. Furthermore, the sizes of the financial-access coefficients 
follow a descending trend (0.005, 0.005, 0.004, 0.002), suggesting a weakening 
beneficial effect on higher income groups. Most interestingly, the same coefficient in the 
highest income quintile-Q5 reverses to a reducing impact equals 0.016 with per 
additional account opening. To summarize, the income share rising effect of banking 
access decreases as the examination reaches to the higher income quintile and even 
reverses to an aggravating impact in the richest group. Thus, this finding supports the 
inequality-reducing ability showed in the first column. 
 
Unlike the results from the impact of banking access, none of the coefficients on 
stock market access is significant in table 29,   indicating that the access to stock market 
is not only powerless in affecting  income inequality but also it is futile in altering the 
income share to any of the five groups. However, this conclusion should be viewed with 
discretion. The market access variable(value traded in top 10 trading companies) tells 
more about the concentration of trading companies, which may not be an accurate 
measure for the access to stock market (i.e. better measures could be the average stock 
market account opened, the trading commissions and fees). 
 
The coefficients on private credit associated with the five quintiles are also 
coherent with the way that the private credit affects the inequality (Table 30). Increasing 
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private credit by one percent of GDP tends to rise 0.027, 0.027 and 0.022 of the income 
share by Q1 Q2 and Q3 respectively. However, the effect becomes insignificant in the 
high-middle quintile and reverse as negative in the highest income quintile. This finding 
is different from Canavire-Bacarreza and Rioja (2009). Targeting on LAC, they find that 
financial deepening is only increasing income share by the middle class, not the poor. 
The pattern of coefficients in this table entails that the benefit of financial deepening 
disproportionately falls in to the hands of the poor and the middle class.  
 
Table 31 shows the impact of stock market expansion on each income quintiles. 
Results here are not offering a clear-cut consistent/inconsistent conclusion. Though gini 
result shows a reducing-inequality effect, quintile result does not show any ascending 
negative impact or descending positive impact. Conversely, more stock traded only 
benefits the top quintile and curbs the income share of the three middle groups. Intrinsic 
role of stock market size in the overall income inequality might be very complex, but the 
result definitely suggests that an excessive expansion of the stock market hurts most 
people in an economy.  
 
The degree of banking sector efficiency is captured by the net interest margin, 
with higher magnitude implying less efficiency (Table 32). The harmful effect of 
inefficiency decreases as we moving from Q1 to Q2 (-0.119 v.s. -0.048). But it reverses 
as a favorable impact in the last three columns in an ascending form. Though only the 
coefficients on net interest margin in Q1 and Q4 are significant at 5% level, the pattern of 
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coefficients still offers some consistency with the inequality-worsening impact showed in 
the first column.  
 
Table 33 offers diverse effects of stock market turnover ratio on different income 
quintiles. Increasing the ratio of value traded to capitalization can help improve the 
income share in four quintile groups but reduce the one shared by Q5. The change of 
direction in coefficients may serve as a piece of evidence that the quintile result is 
coherent with the inequality one. Compare the turnover ratio with the stock market depth- 
measured by the ratio of value traded to GDP, only a denominator difference makes such 
a contrast result: one benefits most of the individuals and the other hurts. The level on the 
valued of stock traded can be increased relative to the capitalization, but it may need to 
be contained relative to the level of GDP. Policy makers and economist may need to 
further evaluate the trade off and discover the intrinsic reasons.  
 
Turning to stabilities result in table 34, coefficients on regulatory capital to risk-
weighted assets in the first four quintiles are all positive and significant. However, like 
the previous case, the same financial coefficient in the top quintile becomes negative. It 
implies that the income share by the rich 20% is more likely to decline if larger ratio of 
regulatory capital is required to hold by banks. Furthermore, it may serve as a piece of 
evidence that the rich 20% includes the practitioners and owners of financial institutions, 
whose income is more closely tied to the profitability of banks.  
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The result on the impact of stock market stability is quite confusing and 
disturbing. As a higher volatility of stock price index suggests less stability, the 
coefficient associated with each quintile is expected to be negative and/or insignificant, 
especially with the lower income quintiles. However, the result in table 35 is telling a 
different story: volatile stock prices can help increasing shares of income in all the first 
four groups, and only declining the share in the rich group. Analyzing together with the 
effect on inequality, the effect of stock volatility is harder to explain. Though all the 
financial coefficients associated with quintiles are highly significant and varies in level, 
the one in the gini regression is positive and not significant at all. The indication of such 
result may require more in-depth study in the future.  
 
As seen in table 36, liberalizing the domestic financial market can reduce the 
income shares of all the first four groups, and only increase the income share by the 
highest income quintile. The sizes of the coefficients also tell that the worsening effect 
reaches a peak in the middle class. 
 
The story in the external financial liberalization (Table 37) is similar with the 
domestic one. The distribution of income worsens as increasing the ratio of consolidated 
foreign claim only benefits the rich quintile. Taken together, results from both external 
and domestic liberalization point out the straightforward fact that, liberalizing the 
financial system crowds out the income share by the 80% less rich majority. 
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2.5. Conclusions 
Based on the well-established literature on the positive effect of financial 
development on economic growth, some economists further investigate the role of 
finance in shaping the resultant growth in income; however, rather than study broader 
aspects of financial development, most of the empirical works are focused on the effect 
of financial deepening, with evidence suggesting that it reduces income inequality and 
poverty. The present study is aimed at expanding the inquiry from financial depth to 
other dimensions of financial sector development: access, efficiency, stability, and 
liberalization.  
 
Our results are significant and robust across different samples and measurements, 
suggesting that financial development, in general, can help reduce income inequality and 
poverty. But the development of financial liberalization tends to have the opposite effect. 
Our evidence also shows that promoting banking sector development has a stronger effect 
on income distribution than the stock market has. Our findings support the positive roles 
played by per capita income and government expenditure in reducing inequality and 
poverty. Inflation, however, is found to harm the income of the poor and income 
distribution.  
 
The additional evidence on income quintiles in section 2.4 also provides a few 
valuable insights. First, in addition to the robustness check with five year average sample, 
it validates the inequality-changing result in a more comprehensive way. Second, such 
detailed effects on the five quintiles--lowest, lower-middle, middle, higher-middle and 
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highest income group--contributes to a better understanding on the movement of income 
distribution due to the financial development. Together with the examination on multiple 
aspects of financial system, this investigation takes the study on the finance-inequality 
nexus to another level. The results on quintiles can better guide the policy making 
associated with the financial system and the income distribution.  
 
Observing the beneficial effects of financial development on both economic 
growth and income distribution, policymakers need to steer the development of the 
financial system in a pro-growth and pro-poor direction. Financial reform policies aimed 
at expanding financial access and depth, as well as enhancing financial efficiency and 
stability, should all be encouraged. These policies may include relaxing credit and 
interest controls, and improving banking and securities market supervision. However, 
given that the financial liberalization aggravates poverty, both domestic and capital 
account liberalization should proceed in a carefully designed and well-sequenced manner 
to avoid offsetting the poverty-reducing gain from the development of other dimensions 
of the financial sector. Indeed, this is a coherent policy recommendation in Chinn and Ito 
(2006), who show that financial liberalization only promotes equity market development 
in the presence of quality legal systems and institutions.  
 
Given that the development of financial institutions has greater impact than 
development of the stock market, policy makers may also give priority to banking sector 
improvement when considering poverty alleviation. According to Kpodar and Singh 
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(2011), governance and institutional reforms are also a precondition for stock market 
development to benefit low-income groups. 
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Table 17: Summary Statistics 
Variables Obs Mean sd Min Max 
Gini-coefficient 1759 39.39 10.91 15.90 76.70 
Poverty gap 804 7.30 10.34 0.00 63.34 
Log GDP per capita 7885 7.63 1.60 4.00 11.59 
Inflation 6438 33.82 487.15 -21.68 24411.00 
Trade openness 7427 76.83 49.13 0.31 460.47 
Government consumption 7100 15.89 6.85 1.38 76.22 
Bank accounts per 1,000 adults 434 333.97 276.46 0.72 988.15 
Value traded in top 10 trading companies (%) 559 55.38 23.10 2.35 99.66 
Private credit to GDP (%) 5844 35.91 35.63 0.12 434.09 
Stock market total value traded to GDP (%) 1942 28.30 58.09 0.00 754.03 
Net interest margin (%) 3807 4.68 3.48 -12.01 40.63 
Stock market turnover ratio (%) 1933 46.04 59.32 0.01 538.20 
Regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets (%) 1276 15.77 5.23 2.50 48.60 
Volatility of stock price index 1281 26.60 15.60 3.86 195.34 
Domestic financial liberalization 2330 8.58 5.50 0.00 18.00 
External financial liberalization (%) 4482 36.07 75.59 0.01 957.14 
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Table 18: Correlations 
Variables  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Gini-coefficient (1) 1.00            
Poverty gap (2) 0.18 1.00           
Bank accounts per 1,000 adults (3) -0.28 -0.49 1.00          
Value traded in top 10 trading 
companies (%) 
(4) 0.02 -0.10 0.07 1.00         
Private credit to GDP (%) (5) -0.24 -0.27 0.71 0.08 1.00        
Stock market total value traded to 
GDP (%) 
(6) -0.14 -0.12 0.16 -0.34 0.47 1.00       
Net interest margin (%) (7) 0.19 0.21 -0.27 -0.02 -0.5 -0.33 1.00      
Stock market turnover ratio (%) (8) -0.23 -0.07 0.08 -0.37 0.26 0.54 -0.30 1.00     
Regulatory capital to risk-weighted 
assets (%) 
(9) -0.09 -0.10 -0.09 0.08 -0.35 -0.18 0.45 -0.23 1.00    
Volatility of stock price index (10) 0.13 0.03 -0.12 0.03 -0.16 -0.04 0.15 0.12 0.16 1.00   
Domestic financial liberalization (11) -0.08 -0.33 0.04 0.30 0.46 0.37 -0.22 0.07 -0.18 -0.33 1.00  
External financial liberalization 
(%) 
(12) 0.04 -0.12 0.35 0.33 0.42 0.24 -0.25 0.00 -0.17 -0.14 -0.04 1.00 
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Table 19: Effects of Financial Access on Income Inequality and Poverty 
  Gini-coefficient  Poverty gap 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  OLS IV OLS IV  OLS IV OLS IV 
Bank accounts per 1000 adults  -0.022*** -0.019***    -0.007* -0.007*   
  (0.00) (0.00)    (0.00) (0.00)   
           
Value traded in top 10 trading companies↓    0.048 0.010    0.015 0.019 
   (0.03) (0.04)    (0.01) (0.01) 
Log GDP per capita  4.468*** 4.360*** -3.066*** -3.062***  -4.344*** -4.028*** -2.339*** -2.056*** 
  (1.02) (1.04) (0.68) (0.75)  (0.93) (0.92) (0.35) (0.44) 
Inflation  -0.054 -0.062 -0.083 -0.004  0.219 0.232 -0.019 -0.019 
  (0.22) (0.29) (0.11) (0.08)  (0.19) (0.21) (0.03) (0.03) 
Trade openness  0.001 -0.005 -0.032*** -0.029**  -0.075*** -0.075** -0.036*** -0.032*** 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) 
Government Consumption  0.366 0.349 -0.351* -0.299  0.107 0.103 0.079 0.072 
  (0.23) (0.24) (0.18) (0.21)  (0.18) (0.19) (0.05) (0.05) 
Constant  15.000* 15.402* 73.253*** 74.200***  42.891*** 40.542*** 21.908*** 19.069*** 
  (8.10) (8.30) (5.52) (5.88)  (7.00) (7.76) (2.51) (3.05) 
R-squared  0.272 0.267 0.229 0.242  0.464 0.462 0.469 0.542 
Observations  102 102 197 157  94 94 112 91 
Hansen’s J statistic   0.6206  0.6996   0.9357  0.1252 
Note: 1. parentheses report standard errors 
          2.* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01  
         3. “↓”indicates that a larger value traded in top 10 trading companies reflects less access to financial markets. 
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Table 20: Effects of Financial Deepening on Income Inequality and Poverty 
   Gini-coefficient  Poverty gap 
   (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
   OLS IV OLS IV  OLS IV OLS IV 
Private credit to GDP  -0.045*** -0.041***    -0.020 -0.019*   
  (0.01) (0.01)    (0.01) (0.01)   
           
Stock market total value traded to 
GDP 
   -0.019* -0.022**    -0.017 -0.015** 
   (0.01) (0.01)    (0.01) (0.01) 
Log GDP per capita   -0.390* -0.459** -0.249 -0.079  -6.544*** -6.607*** -3.745*** -3.005*** 
   (0.23) (0.23) (0.32) (0.32)  (0.28) (0.37) (0.29) (0.48) 
Inflation   0.006*** 0.008*** 0.006*** 0.013***  0.001 0.002** 0.001 0.002*** 
   (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Trade openness   0.003 0.004 -0.029*** -0.031***  -0.029*** -0.024*** -0.030*** -0.027*** 
   (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Government Consumption  -0.500*** -0.476*** -0.699*** -0.714***  0.153** 0.170** 0.006 -0.008 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.08) (0.08)  (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) 
Constant   52.402*** 52.430*** 55.340*** 54.569***  55.593*** 55.789*** 34.954*** 28.983*** 
   (1.61) (1.52) (2.37) (2.50)  (2.10) (2.91) (2.20) (3.53) 
R-squared   0.141 0.139 0.179 0.180  0.484 0.498 0.347 0.285 
Observations   1393 1328 729 618  687 628 412 339 
Hansen’s J statistic    0.3510  0.7253   0.3758  0.9433 
Note: 1. parentheses report standard errors 
          2.* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01  
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Table 21: Effects of Financial Efficiency on Income Inequality and Poverty 
 
  Gini-coefficient  Poverty gap 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  OLS IV OLS IV  OLS IV OLS IV 
Net Interest Margin↓  0.359*** 0.440**    0.062 0.096   
  (0.13) (0.22)    (0.09) (0.18)   
           
Stock market turnover ratio    -0.037*** -0.055***    -0.017*** -0.016*** 
    (0.01) (0.01)    (0.01) (0.00) 
Log GDP per capita  0.116 0.345 -0.465 -0.168  -5.459*** -5.371*** -4.071*** -2.735*** 
  (0.35) (0.37) (0.30) (0.30)  (0.33) (0.44) (0.31) (0.43) 
Inflation  0.031 0.032 0.008*** 0.018***  0.023 0.031 0.002 0.004*** 
  (0.02) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.02) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) 
Trade openness  -0.037*** -0.038*** -0.033*** -0.041***  -0.036*** -0.035*** -0.029*** -0.030*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Government Consumption  -0.572*** -0.580*** -0.655*** -0.695***  0.022 0.015 0.031 -0.019 
  (0.08) (0.10) (0.08) (0.08)  (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05) 
Constant  49.603*** 47.550*** 58.301*** 58.164***  48.046*** 47.061*** 37.545*** 27.576*** 
  (3.14) (3.95) (2.23) (2.39)  (2.73) (3.84) (2.40) (3.34) 
R-squared  0.142 0.141 0.222 0.236  0.440 0.434 0.334 0.295 
Observations  626 626 721 610  461 402 416 333 
Hansen’s J statistic   0.4866  0.9676   0.1105  0.3669 
Note: 1. parentheses report standard errors 
          2.* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01  
          3. “↓” indicates that a larger net interest margin reflects less efficiency of the financial institutions. 
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Table 22: Effects of Financial Stability on Income Inequality and Poverty  
  Gini-coefficient  Poverty gap 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  OLS IV OLS IV  OLS IV OLS IV 
Regulatory capital to   -0.238*** -0.375***    -0.258*** -0.342***   
risk-weighted assets  (0.08) (0.13)    (0.04) (0.10)   
           
Volatility of stock price index↓    -0.039 0.032    -0.043*** 0.031 
    (0.03) (0.07)    (0.01) (0.06) 
Log GDP per capita  -1.235*** -1.360** -1.561*** -1.502***  -3.587*** -4.557*** -1.769*** -1.662*** 
  (0.44) (0.54) (0.39) (0.46)  (0.27) (1.01) (0.24) (0.32) 
Inflation  0.016 0.052 0.008*** 0.013***  -0.012 -0.025 0.002*** 0.001* 
  (0.04) (0.05) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.02) (0.04) (0.00) (0.00) 
Trade openness  -0.038*** -0.035*** -0.024*** -0.023***  -0.030*** -0.025*** -0.032*** -0.025*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) 
Government Consumption  -0.838*** -0.769*** -0.571*** -0.532***  -0.056 0.018 -0.014 0.009 
  (0.10) (0.11) (0.10) (0.11)  (0.05) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) 
Constant  70.831*** 72.337*** 64.659*** 61.846***  38.789*** 46.031*** 20.521*** 16.519*** 
  (4.08) (6.19) (3.52) (5.92)  (2.39) (9.17) (1.97) (3.85) 
R-squared  0.239 0.210 0.200 0.194  0.414 0.307 0.358 0.259 
Observations  487 387 489 418  348 242 254 253 
Hansen’s J statistic   0.1121  0.6011   0.6839  0.2804 
Note: 1. parentheses report standard errors 
          2.* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01  
 
 
 
 
8
2
 
Table 23: Effects of Financial Liberalization on Income Inequality and Poverty  
  Gini-coefficient  Poverty gap 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  OLS IV OLS IV  OLS IV OLS IV 
Domestic financial liberalization  0.206*** 0.209***    -0.026 0.030   
  (0.08) (0.08)    (0.08) (0.09)   
           
External financial liberalization    0.022*** 0.024***    0.037*** 0.038*** 
    (0.01) (0.01)    (0.01) (0.00) 
Log GDP per capita  -0.495* -0.496* -0.678** -0.569**  -5.648*** -5.711*** -6.793*** -6.779*** 
  (0.27) (0.26) (0.27) (0.28)  (0.34) (0.47) (0.27) (0.37) 
Inflation  0.006*** 0.008*** 0.005*** 0.006***  -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Trade openness  -0.027*** -0.026*** -0.029*** -0.031***  -0.065*** -0.067*** -0.052*** -0.052*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Government Consumption  -0.721*** -0.711*** -0.393*** -0.361***  -0.008 -0.012 0.152*** 0.159** 
  (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08)  (0.08) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) 
Constant  54.120*** 54.021*** 53.847*** 52.813***  52.836*** 52.936*** 57.519*** 57.345*** 
  (1.80) (1.84) (2.02) (1.94)  (2.35) (3.56) (2.06) (2.87) 
R-squared  0.211 0.212 0.080 0.070  0.550 0.544 0.494 0.492 
Observations  820 770 1049 998  356 352 698 679 
Hansen’s J statistic   0.1695  0.1823   0.1683  0.6294 
Note: 1. parentheses report standard errors 
          2.* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01  
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Table 24: Economic Significance (Beta Coefficient) 
 
Financial Variables 
Inequality Poverty 
IV IV 
Bank accounts per 1,000 adults -0.486 -0.189 
Value traded in top 10 trading companies↓ 0.022 0.158 
Private credit to GDP -0.133 -0.043 
Stock market total value traded to GDP -0.092 -0.065 
Net interest margin↓ 0.143 0.031 
Stock market turnover ratio  -0.304 -0.168 
Regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets -0.190 -0.385 
Volatility of stock price index↓ 0.046 0.143 
Domestic financial liberalization 0.100 0.016 
External financial liberalization 0.143 0.178 
Note: 1 Beta coefficients are based on global level-IV results; 
          2 Coefficients with underlines suggest worsening inequality/poverty effects (not all are significant); 
          3 Coefficients labeled as bold are the ones that contribute most in reducing inequality/poverty effects. 
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Table 25: Robustness-Gini coefficient 5 year average sample  
  Dependent Variable: Gini-coefficient 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Log GDP per capita 2.391 -3.179* -0.567 -0.202 -0.322 2.869 -0.947 -1.157** -1.578*** -1.423*** 
 (1.67) (1.76) (0.39) (0.54) (0.47) (1.85) (0.60) (0.56) (0.49) (0.39) 
Inflation 0.049 0.079 0.006 0.021*** 0.033*** 0.235* 0.103 0.023*** 0.014*** 0.007** 
 (0.29) (0.43) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.14) (0.13) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Trade openness -0.000 -0.001 0.013** -0.003 -0.007 -0.039** -0.011 -0.006 0.023* -0.015 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Government Consumption 0.301 -0.293 -0.308*** -0.635*** -0.417*** -1.111*** -0.861*** -0.636*** -0.325** -0.202** 
 (0.26) (0.51) (0.09) (0.13) (0.12) (0.30) (0.16) (0.14) (0.16) (0.10) 
Constant 25.44** 80.547*** 51.364*** 51.964*** 45.413*** 38.358*** 66.325*** 60.065*** 55.710*** 54.914*** 
 (10.99) (14.77) (2.37) (3.59) (4.43) (10.05) (7.23) (6.95) (4.12) (2.81) 
Bank accounts per 1,000 adults -0.011*          
 (0.01)          
Value traded in top 10 trading companies↓  -0.144         
  (0.10)         
Private credit to GDP   -0.067***        
   (0.02)        
Stock market total value traded to GDP    -0.029**       
    (0.01)       
Net interest margin↓     -0.726**      
     (0.30)      
Stock market turnover ratio      -0.069***     
      (0.03)     
Regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets       -0.357    
       (0.23)    
Volatility of stock price index↓        -0.051   
        (0.09)   
Domestic financial liberalization         0.035  
         (0.21)  
External financial liberalization          0.030*** 
          (0.01) 
Centered R-squared 0.097 0.352 0.189 0.208 0.182 0.186 0.259 0.237 0.152 0.032 
Observations 75 32 513 231 328 181 152 182 188 441 
Hansen’s J statistic 0.9551 0.4916 0.3176 0.5596 0.4725 0.1785 0.5959 0.5047 0.2432 0.8414 
Note: 1. parentheses report standard errors 
          2.* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01  
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Table 26: Robustness-Poverty Gap 5 year average sample 
  Dependent Variable: Poverty gap 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Log GDP per capita -4.605*** -3.069*** -7.147*** -4.060*** -6.438*** -4.997*** -3.988*** -2.609*** -7.888*** -7.255*** 
 (0.99) (0.86) (0.45) (0.72) (0.54) (0.74) (0.76) (0.98) (0.50) (0.73) 
Inflation 0.235 -0.094 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.013** 0.006*** 0.034 -0.037 0.006** 0.005* 
 (0.27) (0.06) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.06) (0.11) (0.00) (0.00) 
Trade openness -0.043 -0.022*** 0.000 -0.009 -0.030** -0.015 -0.018 -0.026*** -0.038*** -0.036** 
 (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
Government Consumption 0.278 0.131 0.244*** 0.072 0.054 0.174 0.015 0.050 0.193** 0.226* 
 (0.20) (0.09) (0.08) (0.12) (0.10) (0.13) (0.09) (0.14) (0.08) (0.13) 
Constant 41.861*** 25.562*** 58.145*** 34.979*** 52.294*** 42.072*** 41.726*** 22.347*** 64.292*** 60.046*** 
 (7.75) (5.45) (3.55) (4.57) (4.44) (4.97) (6.95) (4.46) (3.88) (5.27) 
Bank accounts per 1,000 adults -0.008**          
 (0.00)          
Value traded in top 10 trading companies↓  0.029         
  (0.02)         
Private credit to GDP   -0.054**        
   (0.02)        
Stock market total value traded to GDP    -0.026*       
    (0.01)       
Net interest margin↓     -0.530*      
     (0.29)      
Stock market turnover ratio      -0.029**     
      (0.01)     
Regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets       -0.404***    
       (0.12)    
Volatility of stock price index↓        0.082   
        (0.15)   
Domestic financial liberalization         0.040***  
         (0.01)  
External financial liberalization          -0.045 
          (0.15) 
Centered R-squared 0.445 0.403 0.535 0.360 0.532 0.386 0.424 0.430 0.533 0.514 
Observations 67 32 289 151 238 138 95 51 283 134 
Hansen’s J statistic 0.7375 0.2419 0.1159 0.4250   0.6715 0.8537 0.5844 0.2444 0.8537 0.5844 
Note: 1. parentheses report standard errors 
          2.* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01  
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Table 27: Summary Statistics and Correlations of Income Quintiles 
Panel A: Summary Statistics of income share by quintiles 
 
 Income share by quintiles (%) Obs Mean S.d. Min Max 
Q1(lowest) 842 5.78 2.40 0.01 11.97 
Q2 842 9.97 2.55 1.85 15.84 
Q3 842 14.39 2.35 5.46 20.65 
Q4 842 21.00 1.60 11.98 26.10 
Q5(highest) 842 48.86 8.49 31.30 78.25 
 
Panel B: Correlation between income share by quintiles with financial variables 
 
 Variables 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
Q1(lowest) (1) 1 
              Q2 (2) 0.97 1 
             Q3 (3) 0.91 0.97 1 
            Q4 (4) 0.65 0.75 0.87 1 
           Q5(highest) (5) -0.95 -0.89 -0.84 -0.55 1 
          Bank accounts per 1,000 adults (6) 0.12 0.2 0.28 0.35 -0.24 1 
         Value traded in top 10 trading companies (%) (7) -0.06 -0.04 -0.05 -0.08 0.06 0.07 1 
        Private credit to GDP (%) (8) -0.01 -0.04 -0.05 -0.01 0.05 0.71 0.08 1 
       Stock market total value traded to GDP (%) (9) 0.03 -0.03 -0.05 -0.06 0.02 0.16 -0.34 0.47 1 
      Net interest margin (%) (10) -0.11 -0.08 -0.05 -0.02 0.07 -0.27 -0.02 -0.5 -0.33 1 
     Stock market turnover ratio (%) (11) 0.19 0.15 0.13 0.07 -0.15 0.08 -0.37 0.26 0.54 -0.3 1 
    Regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets (%) (12) 0.23 0.25 0.26 0.22 -0.25 -0.09 0.08 -0.35 -0.18 0.45 -0.23 1 
   Volatility of stock price index (13) 0.04 0.07 0.1 0.15 -0.09 -0.12 0.03 -0.16 -0.04 0.15 0.12 0.16 1 
  Domestic financial liberalization (14) -0.11 -0.08 -0.06 -0.02 0.07 0.04 0.3 0.46 0.37 -0.22 0.07 -0.18 -0.33 1 
 External financial liberalization (%) (15) -0.16 -0.13 -0.11 -0.02 0.12 0.35 0.33 0.42 0.24 -0.25 0 -0.17 -0.14 0.29 1 
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Table 28: Effects of Financial Institution Access on the Income share by Quintile  
 Inequality Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 
Bank accounts per 1000 adults -0.019*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.002** -0.016*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Log GDP per capita 4.360*** -1.600*** -1.369*** -0.931*** -0.038 3.938*** 
 (1.04) (0.22) (0.22) (0.20) (0.15) (0.74) 
Inflation -0.062 -0.008 0.009 0.007 -0.009 0.002 
 (0.29) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.16) 
Trade openness -0.005 -0.000 0.005 0.006 0.010** -0.021 
 (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.02) 
Government Consumption 0.349 -0.126*** -0.087** -0.043 0.004 0.252** 
 (0.24) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.13) 
Constant 15.402* 16.856*** 18.451*** 19.451*** 19.867*** 25.376*** 
 (8.30) (1.81) (1.77) (1.60) (1.19) (6.06) 
R-squared 0.267 0.464 0.423 0.345 0.196 0.375 
Observations 102 95 95 95 95 95 
Hansen’s J statistic 0.6206 0.6472 0.7206 0.6389 0.6871 0.6548 
Note: 1. parentheses report standard errors 
          2.* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01  
          3. Negative/positive coefficients in Qi (i=1,2,3,4,5) suggest  reducing(increasing) the share of income, not on the level of income possessed by Qi  
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Table 29: Effects of Stock Market Access on the Income share by Quintile  
 Inequality Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 
Value traded in top 10 trading companies↓ 0.010 0.027 0.024 0.020 0.008 -0.079 
 (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.07) 
Log GDP per capita -3.062*** -1.164** -0.690 -0.280 0.353 1.781 
 (0.75) (0.49) (0.53) (0.48) (0.29) (1.76) 
Inflation -0.004 0.070*** 0.075*** 0.063*** 0.017 -0.225*** 
 (0.08) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.09) 
Trade openness -0.029** 0.035*** 0.034*** 0.030*** 0.018*** -0.118*** 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) 
Government Consumption -0.299 0.060 0.041 -0.003 -0.090** -0.008 
 (0.21) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.16) 
Constant 74.200*** 9.572*** 10.307*** 12.663*** 17.451*** 50.007*** 
 (5.88) (3.29) (3.49) (3.13) (1.91) (11.56) 
R-squared 0.242 0.406 0.325 0.254 0.222 0.300 
Observations 157 118 118 118 118 118 
Hansen’s J statistic 0.6996 0.5932 0.2428 0.2040 0.1962 0.2517 
Note: 1. parentheses report standard errors 
          2.* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01  
          3. Negative/positive coefficients in Qi (i=1,2,3,4,5) suggest  reducing(increasing) the share of income, not on the level of income possessed by Qi  
          4. “↓”indicates that a larger value traded in top 10 trading companies reflects less access to financial markets. 
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Table 30: Effects of Financial Institution Depth on the Income share by Quintile  
 Inequality Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 
Private credit to GDP -0.041*** 0.027** 0.027** 0.022* 0.014 -0.066* 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) 
Log GDP per capita -0.459** -0.402*** -0.118 0.049 0.289*** 0.397 
 (0.23) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.07) (0.35) 
Inflation 0.008*** -0.001** -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.001*** 0.005*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Trade openness 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.005** -0.019 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
Government Consumption -0.476*** 0.039* 0.033 0.024 -0.011 -0.198** 
 (0.06) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.09) 
Constant 52.430*** 7.020*** 9.137*** 12.579*** 18.250*** 52.284*** 
 (1.52) (0.74) (0.77) (0.69) (0.46) (2.46) 
R-squared 0.139 0.006 -0.044 -0.045 -0.045 0.003 
Observations 1328 712 713 713 713 713 
Hansen’s J statistic 0.3510 0.6419 0.8652 0.9612 0.8332 0.6868 
Note: 1. parentheses report standard errors 
          2.* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01  
          3. Negative/positive coefficients in Qi (i=1,2,3,4,5) suggest  reducing(increasing) the share of income, not on the level of income possessed by Qi  
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Table 31: Effects of Stock Market Depth on the Income share by Quintile  
 Inequality Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 
Stock market total value traded to GDP -0.022** -0.015 -0.037*** -0.041*** -0.029*** 0.121*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) 
Log GDP per capita -0.079 -0.662*** -0.507*** -0.322** 0.087 1.404*** 
 (0.32) (0.13) (0.15) (0.15) (0.11) (0.51) 
Inflation 0.013*** -0.001** -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.001*** 0.005*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Trade openness -0.031*** 0.018*** 0.020*** 0.019*** 0.012*** -0.068*** 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
Government Consumption -0.714*** 0.060** 0.067** 0.056** 0.002 -0.185** 
 (0.08) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.09) 
Constant 54.569*** 8.832*** 11.843*** 15.148*** 19.789*** 44.388*** 
 (2.50) (1.11) (1.24) (1.17) (0.80) (4.07) 
R-squared 0.180 0.139 0.079 0.049 0.020 0.078 
Observations 618 432 432 432 432 432 
Hansen’s J statistic 0.7253 0.3010 0.1828 0.2175 0.1982 0.1961 
Note: 1. parentheses report standard errors 
          2.* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01  
          3. Negative/positive coefficients in Qi (i=1,2,3,4,5) suggest  reducing(increasing) the share of income, not on the level of income possessed by Qi  
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Table 32: Effects of Financial Institution Efficiency on the Income share by Quintile  
 Inequality Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 
Net Interest Margin↓ 0.440** -0.119** -0.048 0.022 0.063** 0.081 
 (0.22) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.16) 
Log GDP per capita 0.345 -0.425*** -0.186 -0.010 0.219*** 0.402 
 (0.37) (0.12) (0.12) (0.11) (0.07) (0.39) 
Inflation 0.032 -0.008 -0.008 -0.007 -0.003 0.026 
 (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.03) 
Trade openness -0.038*** 0.014*** 0.016*** 0.015*** 0.011*** -0.056*** 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
Government Consumption -0.580*** 0.062*** 0.077*** 0.076*** 0.038*** -0.253*** 
 (0.10) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.08) 
Constant 47.550*** 7.674*** 9.366*** 12.148*** 17.691*** 53.122*** 
 (3.95) (1.05) (1.05) (0.95) (0.63) (3.46) 
R-squared 0.141 0.131 0.120 0.111 0.082 0.120 
Observations 626 479 479 479 479 479 
Hansen’s J statistic 0.4866 0.7920 0.7923 0.7463 0.6707 0.7411 
Note: 1. parentheses report standard errors 
          2.* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01  
          3. Negative/positive coefficients in Qi (i=1,2,3,4,5) suggest  reducing(increasing) the share of income, not on the level of income possessed by Qi  
          4. “↓”indicates that a larger interest margin reflects less efficiency of financial institutions. 
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Table 33: Effects of Stock Market Efficiency on the Income share by Quintile  
 Inequality Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 
Stock market turnover ratio -0.055*** 0.008* 0.010* 0.013** 0.016*** -0.047** 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
Log GDP per capita -0.168 -0.363** -0.025 0.236 0.578*** -0.426 
 (0.30) (0.16) (0.18) (0.18) (0.15) (0.61) 
Inflation 0.018*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 0.008*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Trade openness -0.041*** 0.016*** 0.018*** 0.017*** 0.012*** -0.063*** 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
Government Consumption -0.695*** 0.057** 0.061** 0.047* -0.007 -0.158 
 (0.08) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.10) 
Constant 58.164*** 6.219*** 7.691*** 10.265*** 15.357*** 60.469*** 
 (2.39) (1.41) (1.49) (1.44) (1.27) (5.05) 
R-squared 0.236 0.194 0.158 0.117 -0.117 0.140 
Observations 610 435 435 435 435 435 
Hansen’s J statistic 0.9676 0.2624 0.1584 0.3806 0.5753 0.3988 
Note: 1. parentheses report standard errors 
          2.* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01  
          3. Negative/positive coefficients in Qi (i=1,2,3,4,5) suggest  reducing(increasing) the share of income, not on the level of income possessed by Qi  
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Table 34: Effects of Financial Institution Stability on the Income share by Quintile  
 Inequality Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 
Regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets -0.375*** 0.104*** 0.146*** 0.155*** 0.111*** -0.515*** 
 (0.13) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.11) 
Log GDP per capita -1.360** -0.264 -0.032 0.145 0.346** -0.195 
 (0.54) (0.23) (0.23) (0.21) (0.14) (0.77) 
Inflation 0.052 0.007 0.008 0.002 -0.009 -0.007 
 (0.05) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.05) 
Trade openness -0.035*** 0.020*** 0.021*** 0.019*** 0.013*** -0.074*** 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
Government Consumption -0.769*** 0.074*** 0.084*** 0.076** 0.023 -0.257** 
 (0.11) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.11) 
Constant 72.337*** 3.248 4.734** 7.993*** 15.158*** 68.867*** 
 (6.19) (2.31) (2.30) (2.03) (1.34) (7.60) 
R-squared 0.210 0.180 0.187 0.181 0.152 0.184 
Observations 387 293 293 293 293 293 
Hansen’s J statistic 0.1121 0.1759 0.2029 0.1889 0.1952 0.1661 
Note: 1. parentheses report standard errors 
          2.* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01  
          3. Negative/positive coefficients in Qi (i=1,2,3,4,5) suggest  reducing(increasing) the share of income, not on the level of income possessed by Qi  
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Table 35: Effects of Stock Market Stability on the Income share by Quintile  
 Inequality Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 
Volatility of stock price index↓ 0.032 0.117*** 0.111*** 0.106*** 0.077*** -0.411*** 
 (0.07) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.09) 
Log GDP per capita -1.502*** -0.813*** -0.353 -0.053 0.390** 0.829 
 (0.46) (0.31) (0.30) (0.27) (0.19) (1.02) 
Inflation 0.013*** -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.002*** 0.010*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Trade openness -0.023*** 0.032*** 0.032*** 0.029*** 0.019*** -0.113*** 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) 
Government Consumption -0.532*** 0.047 0.037 0.023 -0.032 -0.076 
 (0.11) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.14) 
Constant 61.846*** 5.448** 6.354*** 8.988*** 14.593*** 64.617*** 
 (5.92) (2.52) (2.42) (2.17) (1.53) (8.30) 
R-squared 0.194 -0.002 0.045 0.032 -0.041 0.003 
Observations 418 267 267 267 267 267 
Hansen’s J statistic 0.6011 0.8656 0.2931 0.2187 0.1635 0.3130 
Note: 1. parentheses report standard errors 
          2.* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01  
          3. Negative/positive coefficients in Qi (i=1,2,3,4,5) suggest  reducing(increasing) the share of income, not on the level of income possessed by Qi  
          4. “↓”indicates that a larger volatility of stock price index reflects less stability of financial markets. 
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Table 36: Effects of Domestic Financial Liberalization on the Income share by Quintile  
 Inequality Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 
Domestic financial liberalization 0.209*** -0.052* -0.083*** -0.092*** -0.080*** 0.306*** 
 (0.08) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.10) 
Log GDP per capita -0.496* -0.932*** -0.590*** -0.284** 0.264*** 1.543*** 
 (0.26) (0.13) (0.14) (0.13) (0.09) (0.46) 
Inflation 0.008*** -0.001** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 0.005*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Trade openness -0.026*** 0.022*** 0.026*** 0.025*** 0.017*** -0.090*** 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
Government Consumption -0.711*** 0.055** 0.056* 0.036 -0.016 -0.130 
 (0.07) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.11) 
Constant 54.021*** 10.858*** 12.708*** 15.286*** 19.024*** 42.123*** 
 (1.84) (0.87) (0.89) (0.80) (0.56) (2.91) 
R-squared 0.212 0.282 0.241 0.205 0.108 0.225 
Observations 770 363 363 363 363 363 
Hansen’s J statistic 0.1695 0.3486 0.6619 0.8819 0.2902 0.9570 
Note: 1. parentheses report standard errors 
          2.* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01  
          3. Negative/positive coefficients in Qi (i=1,2,3,4,5) suggest  reducing(increasing) the share of income, not on the level of income possessed by Qi  
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Table 37: Effects of External Financial Liberalization on the Income share by Quintile  
 Inequality Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 
External financial liberalization 0.024*** -0.019*** -0.021*** -0.019*** -0.010*** 0.066*** 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
Log GDP per capita -0.569** -0.223** 0.071 0.214** 0.362*** -0.167 
 (0.28) (0.10) (0.11) (0.10) (0.08) (0.36) 
Inflation 0.006*** -0.001 -0.001** -0.001*** -0.001*** 0.004** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Trade openness -0.031*** 0.017*** 0.019*** 0.018*** 0.011*** -0.060*** 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
Government Consumption -0.361*** 0.027 0.020 0.013 -0.015 -0.155* 
 (0.08) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.09) 
Constant 52.813*** 6.094*** 8.142*** 11.684*** 17.905*** 55.390*** 
 (1.94) (0.75) (0.77) (0.68) (0.46) (2.47) 
R-squared 0.070 0.078 0.046 0.036 0.023 0.058 
Observations 998 719 720 720 720 720 
Hansen’s J statistic 0.1823 0.1181 0.1327 0.1725 0.4340 0.0458 
Note: 1. parentheses report standard errors 
          2.* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01  
          3. Negative/positive coefficients in Qi (i=1,2,3,4,5) suggest  reducing(increasing) the share of income, not on the level of income possessed by Qi  
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APPENDIX B: VARIABLE DEFINITION AND DATA SOURCE 
 Variables Definition Source 
Gini coefficient Gini coefficient measures income inequality, with 0 resembles perfectly equal outcome, while, 100 
percent reflects extremely unequal condition.  
World Bank, All the Ginis 
database (2013) 
Poverty gap Poverty Gap Index, measures the average income shortfall of the poor individual from the poverty line 
($1.25 a day). 
World Bank, PovcalNet 
Log GDP per capita Log of GDP per capita (constant 2000 US$) World Development 
Indicators(henceforth WDI) 
Inflation Consumer prices (annual %) WDI 
Trade openness Trade (% of GDP) measures trade openness WDI 
Government  consumption General government final consumption expenditure (% of GDP) WDI 
Bank accounts per 1,000 adults Bank accounts per 1,000 adults World Bank, Global Financial 
Development Database 
(henceforth GFDD) 
Value traded in top 10 trading 
companies (%) 
Value traded in top 10 trading companies (lower values indicates better access to market) GFDD 
Private credit to GDP (%) Private credit to GDP (%) GFDD 
Stock market total value traded to 
GDP (%) 
Stock market total value traded to GDP (%) GFDD 
Net interest margin (%) Net interest margin (larger value suggests less efficiency) GFDD 
Stock market turnover ratio (%) Stock market turnover ratio (%) GFDD 
Regulatory capital to risk-weighted 
assets (%) 
Regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets GFDD 
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Volatility of stock price index Volatility of stock price index (higher values implies less stability) GFDD 
External financial liberalization  Consolidated foreign claims of BIS-reporting banks to GDP (%) GFDD 
Domestic  financial liberalization aggregation of indices of credit control, interest rate control, entry barriers, banking supervision, 
privatization and security market 
Abiad, Detragiache and Tressel 
(2008) 
Ethnic Measure of ethnic fragmentation Alesina, A. et al.(2003) 
(henceforth ADEKW,2003) 
language Measure of  linguistic fractionalization ADEKW(2003) 
Religion Measure of religious fragmentation ADEKW(2003) 
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